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IN THIS NUMBER

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William A. Jump: The Staff Officer as a Personality

By ROBERT A. WALKER

*Professor of Political Science
Stanford University*

ADMINISTRATIVE biographies can be highly valuable in the continuing effort to identify the personal traits which contribute to administrative success, and in providing insight into the personality structure underlying these traits. There are, however, a number of obstacles to getting a useful series of such biographies. One of the most serious is the fact that a writer must have observed his subject in action over a period of time in order to describe with conviction the characteristics that are most important in an administrator's success. But if the person reporting has been close enough to make such observations, he is likely to have become part of the circle of friends and colleagues who share affectionate ties with the person involved. If the person is still alive, this virtually stops publication of anything which contains elements that can be construed as critical; if he is recently deceased, the others in the personal circle may be offended by comment raising questions or seeming to affront a cherished memory. The potential complications are obvious. As a result, the literature is lacking in biographical studies of current or recent administrators of note which substitute appraisal for eulogy.

The writer labors under all of these difficulties in venturing a study of the career of William A. Jump. Indeed, one of the distinguishing attributes of Jump's administrative ability was his capacity for causing great affection and sentimental attachment among those around him. In the five years that he worked closely with Jump, the writer came to share this affection fully with his colleagues of the period. Nonetheless, Jump's success was so marked, his influence so decisive, that it seems worth

while to look as objectively as possible into the nature of the man and of his contribution to administration.

This paper will present first that phase of Jump's career on which his far-reaching reputation was principally based—his work as budget officer of the Department of Agriculture and the contributions which he made to advancing budgeting as an administrative staff function. The second section will attempt to describe the personal characteristics which made him a highly effective "operator" in a wide variety of administrative situations over many years. A third section will attempt some possible explanations of his personality structure.

Jump's Contribution to the Budget Function

JUMP'S contribution to public budgeting could be developed into a monograph. He played a major role in creating the modern view of the budget and of the budget official in governmental administration. In some twenty-six years as budget officer of the Department of Agriculture he had a key part in giving substance to the broad idea of executive budgeting embodied in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Consciously and skillfully he participated in, and often led, the movement to transform the federal budget from an accountant's workbook to a policy-oriented allocation of financial resources among public programs. He stated many times, publicly and in personal conversation, that the budget was basically a "plan of work." The phrase has become commonplace, but it was not when he first began using it. This conception of the budget can be found in a number of Jump's talks and papers,

but nowhere does he make more clear his ideas about the relation between the budget and accounting skills than in the following extemporaneous remarks:

About the time William Mosher started to pay us visits in the Federal Government, the concept of a budget was that it was some kind of a document with a great many figures in it, largely derived from, and put together by, the accountants and bookkeepers—a purely fiscal document for a purely fiscal purpose. . . .

Let's look at what has happened in twenty-five years! In that period the Budget has not ceased to be a fiscal document, but it has ceased to be just a fiscal document. It has become a great economic, social, and policy instrumentality of government in the broadest, most dynamic, and significant sense. In part at least this has come about by reason of the particular way in which we practice democracy in America—and in this we even differ from some of the other democracies. Under our procedure, the Federal Budget has become the vehicle by which the executive presents to the legislative body not only the expenditure, or fiscal plans, but also the proposed program of work of the Government of the United States for the ensuing year. . . . It is a big thought. It means that the Budget process is the means by which our Congress not only discharges its guardianship of the public purse in America, by determining how much may come out of that purse, but in practice it means that our Congress, at the same time, determines precisely what the program of work will be, after its consideration and evaluation of the proposals submitted in the Executive Budget.¹

In order to give substance to the conception of the budget as a method for programming work, and making policy choices, Jump and his staff developed during the 1930's a system for dividing the budget of the U. S. Department of Agriculture into financial projects. The financial project was a broad division of an agency's program, stated in terms of the kind of work to be done—as range management—within the appropriation for protection and management of the national forests. This mode of presentation is to be contrasted with the older objects-of-expenditure breakdown of appropriation items, which divides an appropriation into amounts to be spent for personal services, sup-

plies, travel, etc., but tells nothing about the kinds of work contemplated with the money. This "program" basis for budget preparation spread gradually to other agencies in Washington. It was later to be spotlighted by the work of the Hoover Commission and enthusiastically embraced by the Bureau of the Budget as "performance budgeting." But the idea of developing work units on which performance could be measured, as the foundation of budget-making, was well advanced in the Department of Agriculture over a decade before the Hoover Commission was appointed.²

As he saw the federal budget as the vehicle through which the Executive and the Congress make policy choices, so too did Jump develop an image of the departmental budget officer which was a far cry from the accountant compiling figures. Jump was exacting in his insistence that the figures be accurate. But the substance of the budget officer's task he saw as counsel and advocate for the department and its agencies in all matters involving the getting and spending of money. This role he carefully formulated in a talk he gave at Princeton in 1939. In his role as counsel to the department, Jump observed that the budget officer

. . . is generally responsible for the satisfactory conduct of all budgetary and financial affairs of the department. It is imperative, therefore, that he have the complete confidence of, and intimate personal contact with, the cabinet secretary or other head of the establishment. Ideally, he acts also as one of the principal administrative advisors to the department head. The same relationship is maintained with the under-secretaries, assistant secretaries, and other members of the executive staff.³

¹ The procedural device in the Department of Agriculture through which agency programs and the budget were correlated became known officially as the uniform project system. This was a programming and reporting file which carried careful descriptions of each "financial project" and of more detailed subdivisions known as "work projects." Annual progress reports were required of the agencies, aimed at making clear what had been accomplished in each project with the funds spent. In practice, the rapid expansion of the Department of Agriculture and the manpower shortage during World War II combined to make the reporting phases of the project system largely inoperative.

² W. A. Jump, "Budgetary and Financial Administration in an Operating Department of the Federal Government," a talk at a conference of the Governmental Research Association, Princeton, N. J., Sept. 8, 1939 (mimeo.), p. 2.

³ From remarks made at the installation of Paul Appleby as dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, on May 11, 1947.

As this role as adviser would seem to imply, Jump felt that his primary loyalty was to his department head, not to the Bureau of the Budget, Treasury, or General Accounting Office, in resolving conflicting views (as distinguished from official directives) on policy matters. Ideally, he thought the director of the Bureau of the Budget "may justifiably look upon departmental budget officers as members of his general staff." But in the real world

. . . as the wheels turn from day to day there inevitably are severe differences of judgment as to whether funds should be provided for a given purpose and, if so, in what amount, whether one course of action or another is to be followed, and so on. These differences are numerous and far reaching in effect. They may relate to a specific item or they may involve a major policy. . . .

It is at this stage that the departmental budget officer becomes an advocate or special pleader of the cause he represents. His position in representing the department is then analogous to that of an attorney for his client. In such circumstances, departmental budget officers put up the strongest and most effective fight of which they are capable. . . . On these occasions no apologies are offered for a vigorous position, or even an occasional showing of teeth, if circumstances seem to require it.⁴

Jump had a clear conception of the role of the staff officer which helps explain his great success in that role under many successive Secretaries of Agriculture.⁵ Thus he distinguished constantly and effectively between the separate, but often confused, roles of financial adviser to the Secretary, on the one hand, and custodian of certain specific legal powers as departmental budget officer under the Budget and Accounting Act, on the other.

In the first capacity, he was always the staff officer—advising, counseling, advocating on the Secretary's behalf, and implementing his decisions as the occasion required. Here he was scrupulous in speaking, or writing, always in the name of the Secretary. "The Secretary has asked me to advise you that . . ." was the typical form of expression in such cases, and he was extremely careful always to sign docu-

ments issued in his staff capacity as "Director of Finance," a departmentally-created position and title.

When, however, he was carrying out his responsibilities for budget preparation or fiscal control under the Budget and Accounting Act, which set forth legal powers and responsibilities for budget officers, he signed the documents as "Budget Officer." He was fully aware that these were binding directives on the agencies of the department in his own name. This careful separation of his authority to issue directives on technical financial matters and his staff role, where he never presumed to act as though he had line authority, was a major contribution—at least to the education of those who worked with him. Civilian administration seldom achieves such clarity.

At one point, late in his career, Jump undertook to keep the Budget Bureau from straying into assumptions of authority which he believed it did not possess. The occasion was a proposed new section of the Bureau of the Budget's instructions to the departments on budget preparation, concerning departmental appeals from allowances on budget requests. The proposed section specified that any appeals should be only by letter from the head of the department to the director of the Bureau of the Budget, and that they would "be entertained *only* if new facts having a *material* bearing on the estimates have become available after the close of the hearings, or if it can be demonstrated that some mechanical *error* has been made in the determination.⁶

Jump himself wrote a letter to the director of the bureau protesting the assumptions underlying such a directive, stating that

If issued in this form I believe it would give the impression that once the Budget Bureau has arrived at a judgment about the matter, that judgment is not open to appeal by the head of a department, within the executive branch of the government, except on highly restrictive terms usually found only in the rules of judicial procedure governing litigation in the courts. Under the first sentence [limiting appeals to letters addressed to the Director of the Budget], apparently a cabinet head of a department could not appeal directly to the President about a budget matter. Under the last sentence, apparently no discussion could be had

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵ Jump actually served under eleven Secretaries from his appointment as a messenger in 1906. His first major staff appointment was as personal secretary to Secretary Henry C. Wallace in 1921. He was designated budget officer of the department in 1922.

⁶ Quoted in a letter of June 8, 1948, from W. A. Jump to the Bureau of the Budget. Italics are from the letter.

with the Budget Director of the reasonableness or advisability of the judgment which the Budget Bureau had formed.⁷

In brief, Jump was urging that the Bureau of the Budget exercise the same restraint in the relations between the President and the Cabinet Secretaries that he himself scrupulously observed in the relations between the Secretary and the bureau chiefs. The directive he protested was not issued.

The care Jump observed in defining the role of budget officials in executive management he extended also to relations between Congress and the departments. His ability to get along with congressional committees suggested touches of genius, and will be discussed below. Here, however, it must be noted that the American governmental system was, to him, far more than a set of legal procedural requirements. The rise of executive budgeting, with its emphasis on presidential control of the executive branch, never obscured for Jump the all-important role which he felt Congress did and should play in determining public policy. This has already been suggested in the quotation from the Appleby inaugural. But he repeatedly, and in other settings, dissented from the marked tendency, as he saw it, for professors and those outside the government to overemphasize the role of the Bureau of the Budget in federal budgetary administration. This he regarded as not the fault of the professors but of the operating agencies in failing to make full use of academic talents. The result he saw as an inevitable gravitation of academicians to the Bureau of the Budget, and a corresponding tendency on the part of these academicians—when they later exercised their special talents for verbalization—to misunderstand the place of the departments and of congressional committees in the budget process.

The sharpest statement of this view came in his draft of a review of a widely-used text, prepared almost wholly by a group of professors who saw wartime service in the Bureau of the Budget.⁸ Here he took sharp exception to the implication in one section of the book headed,

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Fritz Morstein Marx (ed.), *Elements of Public Administration* (Prentice-Hall, 1946). This review appeared in *7 Public Administration Review* 208 under the title "The Professors and the Practitioners."

"Desertions from the President's Program," that the departments systematically violate the spirit of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 by managing "to get their wishes on the record through the interposition of friendly Congressmen." Not so, said Jump, arguing that only an observer, who has been overexposed to the central budget control aspects and underexposed to the realities which confront responsible officials in operating agencies who deal continuously and extensively with legislative bodies, could hold [this] naive belief. . . .

I am personally aware of the fact that questions which Members of Congress raise about budget estimates come not from "managing" or devising on the part of members of the program agencies to have such questions raised so that they can "get their wishes on the record," but they arise because tax-paying American citizens have exercised their right to make *their* questions, wishes and reactions known to their Congressmen who in turn examine budgets with techniques of their own that over the years I have found to be highly competent and effective. . . . I believe the country will be in a sorry state when the desire of legislative bodies to probe into judgments about budgets is dependent to that degree upon how bureau heads feel.⁹

Throughout his career as budget officer, Jump preserved his regard for the thoroughness of Congress in reflecting what the American people wanted to know about public programs. It was by no means a pose, or a device for preserving good relations with appropriations committeemen. He felt that congressmen generally asked the "right questions," however vexatious they might appear on occasion in dealing with an individual administrative officer. In a letter to the Hon. Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, written only a few days before Jump's death, he reaffirmed that

. . . I have found Congress to be not weak as the public sometimes seems to believe nor muddle-headed as is the viewpoint often expressed by seg-

* The section of the review utilized here is from Jump's original draft. It did not appear in the published version, probably because of the considerable length of the draft. He prefaced his comments on this section of the book with the statement that the author is "one of my very favorite political scientists." But it states clearly a point of view that was close to Jump's heart and was one of his chief points of difference with the professional students of administration.

ments of the public. On the contrary, I have found that Congress is generally strong and generally sound, and working upon a final discovery in the best public interest of a solution of the great pending questions of the day. . . . My 30 years before Congress has led me to believe that there is not a single thing of such fundamental importance as for the people to grasp fully their great dependence on the legislative system.¹⁰

With this respect for Congress as an institution, Jump coupled a unique ability to explain departmental activities in terms which members of Congress could understand, to reinterpret the sometimes inept blunderings of witnesses so as to divert the wrath of committee members, and to convince the committees that his own integrity was above suspicion. The House Committee on Appropriations, particularly, was so appreciative of his assistance that it initiated and voted him an increase in salary—which he earnestly pleaded be deleted from the bill because it would put his salary out of line with the salaries of comparable officers of the department. Congressman Cannon noted in his speech of appreciation on Jump's retirement that "it is the only instance within my knowledge when an employee of the Government declined an increase in compensation."¹¹

Jump's insistence that the relationship between the departments and the Congress be not minimized suggests another facet of his view of government and its place in society. He had a strongly held conviction that the employees of government agencies are public servants in the precise sense of that term—servants of the public. As a result, he took a dim view of any efforts on the part of overenthusiastic officials of the department to manipulate the public or to bring pressure on Congress. Where any instance of employee activity of this kind, involving public funds or appropriation requests, came to his attention he moved promptly and firmly. This writer recalls drafting a strongly worded memorandum for his signature on an occasion when an ill-advised technician of one agency signed a petition to a congressman urging larger appropriations for

that agency. On another occasion he himself dictated a memorandum to a bureau chief, sending along a clipping which quoted one of his field men on the need for greater appropriations. The bureau was already experiencing some difficulties in its relations with the appropriations committees, which led Jump to suggest tactfully but firmly that

*. . . especially in view of present conditions, it occurs to me it is the kind of thing that can cause [your agency] and the Department considerable embarrassment. I thought it ought to be brought to your personal attention. I know you agree that this is a period when it obviously is necessary for all concerned to avoid any embarrassing episodes involving appropriations.*¹²

It may have been this firm interpretation of the legal and strategic restraints upon bureaucrats in putting pressure on Congress that led to the only really caustic criticism of Jump that this writer ever heard—to the effect that he had sold one program "down the river" to conservative elements on the appropriations committees. This the writer regards as a rather adolescent protest against the firm hand of an administrator who took seriously his obligations as a staff officer. Neither in this situation nor in any other did the writer ever see Jump substitute his own views for a decision of the Secretary's Office. Once a decision had been made he would devote all of his considerable talents to getting it carried out—however painful it might be to a particular subordinate unit or official of the department.

Not the least of Jump's contributions to better budget practice in the federal government was his devotion to teaching and to professional relations. For many years he taught a course in budgeting at American University and provided leadership for another in the Graduate School of the Department of Agriculture. He felt this to be something of an obligation—a service that he could render to improved governmental practice. He also enjoyed it, and appears to have found it a welcome relief from the daily pressures of his position.¹³

In view of what has been said, it will be clear

¹⁰ 95 *Congressional Record* No. 13 (Jan. 24, 1949), Appendix.

¹¹ Speech in the House of Representatives, 95 *Congressional Record* No. 13 (Jan. 24, 1949), Appendix.

¹² Memorandum of March 7, 1947. Italics are Jump's.

¹³ This was confirmed by Mrs. Jump in an interview, and in a statement which he once made to the writer that if he had his career to make over he would have liked to teach in a university.

that he was discontent with the narrow view which many budget technicians seemed to take of their duties. Thus he worked actively to train and to draw into departmental budget offices more broadly trained men who could put the fiscal technicalities of budgeting into political perspective. Jump attracted to his own office a series of younger men trained primarily in political science and public administration, with little regard for their proficiency in accounting or budgeting techniques. Most of these men have remained in government service and moved to high administrative posts, though few remain in the USDA. Jump's attitude toward recruitment is indicated in his remark to the writer, when the latter was assisting in finding a man for a vacancy: "Try to find someone broadly trained in political science. I can teach him what he needs to know about the technical side of budgeting in six months. I can't make an educated man out of him in that time." This need for breadth in the training of young men and women entering government service was, in fact, a favorite theme of his, although he was equally insistent that such people must be willing to do the "grubby" work of administration.

In addition to his teaching activities in Washington, Jump regularly spent several days each year at Syracuse University as visiting lecturer. He took part in a number of institutes and conferences on administration, where the astuteness of his comments soon built a substantial reputation for him among academicians in the field. The professional contacts he developed with university personnel he valued highly and conscientiously maintained. As has been noted, he saw great gain for the public service in attracting the teachers into government for a tour of duty—only regretting that more of them were not utilized in line departments rather than concentrated in presidential staff agencies. He also saw the need for a Washington headquarters of professional political scientists, to facilitate ready interaction, at least a decade before the Washington office of the American Political Science Association was established in 1951.¹⁴

¹⁴ In a letter addressed to Joseph P. Harris, about the time plans were maturing for creating the American Society for Public Administration, he said: "As far as the Federal jurisdiction is concerned, relationships be-

The Source of Jump's Operating Effectiveness

WHAT are the attributes that contribute to a successful career in the civilian public service? This is the question to which we seek, in the long run, some kind of informed answer. Perhaps by looking at the working characteristics which impressed themselves on Jump's associates one may suggest the beginnings of an answer.

The first thing to note was his self-imposed demand for absolute reliability. Secretaries, committeemen, and bureau chiefs alike came to learn that Jump could be depended upon. He safeguarded this reputation zealously. Whether he was giving advice or carrying out a directive, Jump never acted without being sure of himself. Before going to a meeting with the Secretary, he would review the subject of the discussion (if he knew it) with aides and take whatever factual information could be assembled with him. If he did not recall the facts—and his capacity for recall was huge—he would say so and suggest getting them together. He did not "guess" or take a chance, either in advising his superiors or interpreting the Secretary's Office to the bureaus. Thus he never issued a directive or took action until he was certain of being supported. In personal conversation, he would at times suggest to bureau personnel the "probable" attitude of the Secretary's Office on a particular question. He himself never suggested that such an opinion had any authority, although, in fact, it came to have tremendous influence in the department simply because he so seldom guessed wrong. And if Jump indicated what his advice to the Secretary's Office was going to be on a particular issue, only rarely did a bureau chief think it worth while to try to get an opposite decision.

In his staff capacity as an adviser to Secretaries, he seldom urged any particular decision on the Secretary and he did not get himself emotionally involved with any preferred solution to a policy problem. His technique was to

tween political scientists and public officials would be promoted most effectively if there were some office or other headquarters in Washington that more or less definitely represented the political science group." The copy of the letter in the writer's possession is undated, and he is not certain that it was sent. Internally, however, it can be dated as about 1939 or 1940.

pose several alternative courses of action and then to appraise the probable consequences, political and administrative, of each. "If you select alternative A, Mr. Secretary," he would say, "you will undoubtedly have the support of the Budget Bureau group, but there will be an internal problem with the bureau, and Congressman X is going to give us trouble on the House Committee." Alternatives B and C, if any, would be reviewed with equal dispassion. In these confidential sessions Jump was the voice of experience. There were few contingencies for which he could not recall a parallel from the past, humorous or ominous as the case might be. And Secretary after Secretary listened carefully to his astute counsel, whatever the political complexion of the administration. Let no one think that Jump avoided "politics" in such sessions as this. On the contrary, he was always careful to make clear, as best he could foresee them, the probable political consequences—especially as they affected relations with Congress—of any course of action the Secretary might select. But this type of counsel he spoke of but seldom outside, and he never let it be known that he differed in any way with whatever decision might be reached. Jump the confidential adviser had to be seen in action to be appreciated.

Perhaps an important part of this reliability, and of his skill in selling himself to a series of Secretaries, was the fact that he was not a crusader for any social cause. He had convictions, as we have seen in the first part of this paper. When asked, he was quite willing to let his views be known. But he never shaped his advice, or his appraisal of the political and administrative situation, to get the decision he would have favored. He presented facts and opinions militating against his personal views with complete candor, and he never gave cause to doubt that he would help secure the action decided upon whether it coincided with his private opinions or not.

Another attribute which everyone recognized in Jump was his extreme tactfulness. He made indirection into a virtue; the softened blow into an art. If put into the position of having to communicate an unfavorable decision from the Secretary's Office to an officer of the department, Jump would take infinite pains to make clear the background of the de-

cision, the many factors bearing upon it, the reluctance of the Secretary's Office to take the action at hand, and the continuing appreciation which everyone felt for the work which the agency and the officer were doing. His voice and manner of speaking were important factors here. He was reassuring, serious, humorous, or sharing the official's depression as the situation demanded. As long as Jump was not challenged in these situations his patience was infinite, his calm unshakeable. If, however, there was any suggestion of doubt concerning the integrity of his own role in the situation or the authority behind his communication of a decision, Jump was a different man. As one bureau official put it, "There was a margin beyond which Jump couldn't be pushed. After you got to know him, you could sense it coming."

On at least two occasions, to the writer's personal knowledge, high bureau officials failed to "sense it coming." On one of these, Jump became angry and launched into a caustic and extended commentary on the deficiencies, both personal and professional, of the two officials involved.¹⁵ On another occasion, in the writer's presence, Jump had his calm and considerate explanation of an adverse decision, involving the transfer of a program from one agency to another, brushed aside by the head of the agency that had lost. As Jump quietly explained all of the considerations behind the Secretary's decision to transfer the program, a decision reflecting firmly-held attitudes in the Bureau of the Budget and on the appropriations committees, the bureau head showed signs of mounting anger.¹⁶ A sense of tension permeated the room when Jump completed his explanation of the action taken. Suddenly the bureau chief burst out violently, "Never as long as I am head of _____, will I agree to this transfer!" There were a few seconds of silence. Then Jump put his hands on the table, and in angry, measured tones that froze said, "Mr. _____, you have no alternative. The decision has been made." He arose abruptly, turned and left the room. Those left behind sat

¹⁵ The writer was not present at this session, but had it reliably reported by two witnesses who were.

¹⁶ Participating in this meeting were the land use coordinator and an aide, the bureau chief and his principal administrative officer, Jump, and the writer.

in a mild state of shock for a moment, then with embarrassed glances at each other and avoiding the eyes of the visibly shaken bureau head they wandered out.

The third characteristic that impressed all who knew Jump was his capacity for work. He took work home as a matter of course, and worked on it virtually every evening.¹⁷ He abandoned golf rather early in his career, because as he put it once to the writer, "There just doesn't seem to be time for it." He would repeatedly postpone vacations waiting for the "right time," and often take them then in short snatches to avoid being away from the office too long.

Behind his long hours of work was the desire to preserve the reliability that has already been mentioned. Nothing of any importance went out of his office (until very late in his career) without his having personally read it. More often than not, he added his editorial touch. This extended even to reading every word of the great volume of written material submitted to the House Appropriations Committee in support of the agriculture budget each year. At one time this amounted to as much as thirteen thick volumes of single-spaced mimeographed material. Usually the same material had been previously read and edited by at least three other responsible members of his staff. But he was not comfortable about its accuracy or, perhaps more importantly, about the possible ill-effects on congressmen of poorly-phrased statements in the material until he himself had gone over it. Much of his endless home work consisted of rewriting materials, to soften a pointed statement, to add an interpretive clause, to delete an impolitic observation on past or proposed policy.¹⁸

Jump had tremendous sensitivity to the effects of both the written and the spoken word

¹⁷ Confirmed in conversation with Mrs. Jump.

¹⁸ Jump's writing was replete with dependent clauses. Members of his staff would carry on running campaigns to get clarity and short, easily read, sentences into material going out of the office. More often than not, a precisely-worded memo would emerge from Jump's editorial work with as many as five or six qualifying clauses strung into one sentence. To this writer's protest he once laughingly observed, "If you get all the qualifications into one sentence, it makes it harder for them to quote you out of context." His often cumbersome, but always careful, writing was a form of protective coloration—as is most governmentese.

on other people. He sensed the effects of what he was saying as clearly as he thought about its inherent content. Much of his testimony before committees, in fact, has a rambling, almost fuzzy quality, if read in the published hearings. But the effect of it on congressmen was to reassure them, to convey a warm feeling of a man with great amounts of information at his fingertips, and to establish his heartfelt concern for the problem as viewed by the committee or any member of it.

This ability to put himself in the place of the other person, and to convince that person that he shared his every concern with a problem, extended into virtually all of Jump's interpersonal relations. He seldom became so preoccupied with the affairs of the day that he forgot a pleasant greeting, a cheery rejoinder, or a humorous comment as needed. He created a sense of shared participation in a project or problem as few men can. Thus a member of the staff could bring him a draft of a memorandum, sit with Jump while the latter made extensive alterations in the draft, yet emerge feeling that his work was highly regarded and that Jump was a wonderful person. Throughout the session, basic changes were likely to be accompanied with comments on the great complexity of the matter at hand, the extreme difficulty of saying just what one meant to say, and laughing comments on the poor stenographer's reaction when she had to decipher the changes and rewrite the memorandum for the tenth time. In brief, a working session with Jump on the most difficult problem was more than likely to turn out a pleasant personal experience.

The atmosphere of a conference with Jump was always relaxed, even if one were a new and lowly employee. There was every evidence that he genuinely liked people, and having come up from the bottom himself he was as considerate with the messenger as with his top assistants. He anticipated hurt feelings before they happened and would work hard to prepare a member of his staff for any change which the latter might regard as unfavorable. If a promotion were to be made, he would carefully talk the situation over with those who might feel passed over to reassure them as best he could. In one instance, he made a major promotion to assistant director only after having carefully dis-

cussed it beforehand with each of the possible candidates except the one he had decided to advance. The latter learned of it only when the action was announced in open staff meeting!

As he anticipated the feelings of others, he also was slow to condemn. Mrs. Jump has suggested to the writer that "tolerant" was the one best word to describe him. Commenting on his intense distaste for interpersonal conflict, she observed that Jump had a strong sense of how circumstances affect what people do and that he never passed judgment until he knew the whole situation. He extended this attitude to his family and children, as well as to his co-workers. If one indulged in any sweeping criticism of a member of the staff, he was likely to be met with suggestions that the matter be looked into a little further, reminders of the employee's good points, and preliminary explorations of ways in which the person involved might be utilized to better advantage. He tended to give an outraged supervisor or colleague the feeling that inevitably the difficulty had many facets—and that the critic was quite possibly one of them.

It should not be supposed, however, that this gentleness of spirit and sensitivity to people resulted in any "softness" when real issues or important policy decisions were at stake. Jump was a bureaucratic "realist" of the first water. If a man were proving incompetent, Jump might soften the blow but he would either reorganize him into a spot where he was relatively harmless or, in severe cases, work to edge him out of the organization.

Similarly, if any proposed administrative action threatened the powers or status of the Office of Budget and Finance, Jump was the master of bureaucratic protectionism. Drafts of Secretary's memorandums relating to the distribution of functions in the department were carefully drafted or scrutinized (as the case might be) with an eye to their effect on B&F. If the effect were to detract, careful modifications were made, informal discussions were had with members of the Secretary's immediate staff, and, if necessary, the threat of an open battle with the encroaching office (usually another staff office) was hinted. The basic criterion of B&F jurisdiction in such cases was the relation of the activity involved to budgeting, fiscal control, the Bureau of the Budget, or the

appropriations committees. This led to the inclusion of management studies and the clearance of legislative reports—both paralleling functions of the Bureau of the Budget—and to departmental control of purchasing and travel in order to protect the budget dollar. Jump was particularly solicitous of these related, but sometimes questioned, budgetary functions when any reorganization was under consideration.

Jump was able to combine his hard-headed realism in bureaucratic maneuvering with a humorous perspective on what he was doing. Thus he never became lost in such activity for its own sake. He could be a tough adversary when need be, but he could simultaneously laugh with a member of his own staff over the intricate "footwork" necessary to safeguard the prerogatives of one's office. Perhaps there was something here that truly differentiated Jump from the rank and file of hard-working administrators, for he avoided gravitating into either of two well-populated groups—those so devoted to a particular program that they neglect the bureaucratic and political necessities of keeping it healthy, and those who become so preoccupied with these necessities that they forget the public purpose of their activity.

Jump never lost his sense of leadership in improving the budget function in government, never failed to encourage improvements or to provide support for better administrative methods. But neither did he neglect the foundations of his strength or sit idly by while others chipped away at them. This was, in turn, one of his great strengths in the department, for never did an inquiry come from the Bureau of the Budget, the Treasury, the General Accounting Office, or the clerk of the appropriations committee which Jump and his staff did not carefully examine to see whether or not it was "loaded," in the sense of containing a hidden threat to departmental prerogatives. If they sensed that it was, precautionary measures were at once weighed and pursued.

A final word should be said to reemphasize Jump's ability to create loyalty and personal devotion among those who worked with him. This was more than simply respect for his administrative skill—although this was an important factor. It was principally at the level of deep-lying affection. He was very nearly an

idol to most members of his staff, and the nearly-exclusive standard of judgment for any conduct or the performance of any task was, "How will Mr. Jump react?" This feeling of affection, however, never quite crossed the line of familiarity. He was never called "Bill" by any member of his staff, to the author's knowledge, although it was commonplace for his other associates so to address him. He occupied a pedestal a shade above the ready informality of the remainder of the office.

A concomitant of the tendency to idolize him was an *esprit de corps* that brooked no criticism of Jump within the office. There were periodic rumblings of discontent over the tendency for things to "bog down" in the "front office," as indeed they often did. But Jump was very seldom identified as the cause, even if it were known that the immobile report or memorandum was on his desk. Criticism of the division chiefs or assistant directors for failing to get action, for questionable judgment, or for personal limitations was fair conversational grist. But any suggestion of defect in Jump—that he didn't organize his time adequately or delegate sufficiently—could bring down on the observer wrathful suspicions of disloyalty and even ostracism. The only time that such observations were safely exchanged (as they occasionally were) was in the quiet intimacy of proved friends reflecting privately on the state of affairs at the office.

A detached appraisal of Jump as an administrator demands that one limitation be noted. His willingness to delegate responsibility lagged far behind the growing work load as the department expanded in the nineteen-thirties and forties. During this period the character of the department changed drastically, from a research, educational, and regulatory agency to a major "action" agency administering highly complex conservation, lending, production control, and food distribution programs. Its budget rose to a billion dollars per year. Jump fully recognized the changing character of the department's functions, and the increasing demands they made on budgetary and fiscal administration. To meet these demands he added staff and constantly sought better ways of carrying on the work of the office. But basically, he tried to continue to give the rising volume of work flowing through the office the same kind

of personal, detailed attention that he had been able to give it in an earlier period. Thus he commented upon, and wrote often about, the "increasing complexity" of the budget job, the increasing pressures upon him, the difficulties of keeping up with the "sheer volume" of work, but still he insisted upon reading all of the budget justification statements going to the appropriations committee and personally reviewing a great body of other written material before it was approved for the office. He did not extend his delegation or fundamentally alter his mode of operation to keep pace with the changing nature of his responsibility.¹⁹ Only his willingness to compensate by working long overtime hours kept his immediate office from becoming a major bottleneck.

Jump as a Personality

PERHAPS enough has been said about Jump's characteristics and mode of operation to provide a basis for tentative exploration of the kind of personality which underlay these overt aspects of the man. Among the attributes to be reemphasized here were his great patience, his sensitivity to others, his tolerance, his great desire to avoid error or misstep in his office's output, and his willingness to work endless hours.

There are supplementary observations which must be introduced at this point. First is the fact that behind his calm exterior Jump harbored a high degree of insecurity and anxiety. This came out in a variety of ways. When he was to give a talk, even a brief one, he labored long and hard over it, sought advice and comments from his staff, and otherwise revealed a marked concern about it. This was particularly evident when he was to speak at meetings of professional societies. It was revealed, too, in his emotional involvement whenever any reflection was cast on his integrity or on his professional activity. On occasion, he could become as vitriolic as he was normally calm. Still another evidence of anxiety, in the writer's opinion, was his excessive concern with never being found in error. The long hours spent reading and editing material at home, for ex-

¹⁹ Only in the last two or three years of his career did he modify this practice somewhat and extend his delegations, but this does not basically change the observations made here.

ample, reflected a deep-felt need to avoid criticism or charges of incompetency. The "calculated risk" was no part of his career, however much the diligent avoidance of risk might infringe upon balanced living—in which family life, recreation, and avocations share the waking hours.

Related somewhat to each of the foregoing observations was Jump's intense dislike of conflict. He would go to great lengths to avoid it in any form—even with his children. He posited as the desirable goal in administration the Quaker ideal whereby groups reached decisions by "free discussion and quiet thinking."²⁰ This sharp aversion to conflict led him to go to great lengths of self-sacrifice in time and energy to avoid it. Only when "pushed to the wall" would he abandon it—and then with strong emotional involvement.

Still another characteristic was Jump's inclination toward self-effacement. He was always modest or derogatory about his accomplishments. He was ever willing to submerge his own views and personality in the organization and in his role as staff officer to the Secretary. Thus he never came into conflict with particular Secretaries because of differences of view. He was content with his role of the "indispensable man" and valued it highly, never putting the assertion of self ahead of it.

There seems every reason to believe that there was a high degree of correlation between certain of Jump's well-marked personality traits and his great success as a staff officer. These same traits also fall into a pattern which strongly parallels certain of the most clearly outlined motivational patterns identified by modern psychology. Specifically, the traits which loomed large in Jump's success suggest a pattern which the psychoanalyst knows as the neurotic need for affection. The word "neurotic" is loaded with negative connotations in everyday usage, and the writer introduces it reluctantly. It is, however, the precise word necessary to describe the overwhelming need to please others, to receive affection, and to avoid conflict which Jump revealed.

Karen Horney has set forth the characteristics of the neurotic need for affection and ap-

proval as follows: (1) indiscriminate need to please others and to be liked and approved by others; (2) automatic living up to the expectations of others; (3) center of gravity in others and not in self, with their wishes and opinions the only thing that counts; (4) dread of self-assertion; (5) dread of hostility on the part of others or of hostile feelings within self.²¹

Closely related to the trend toward a need for affection is the need for someone to govern one's existence. In this pattern the dominant element is that the center of gravity of one's existence is in a "partner" who "is to fulfill all expectations of life and take responsibility for good and evil, his manipulation becoming the predominate task." In this pattern, again, there is an overvaluation of "love" or affection because it is expected to solve all of one's problems.

A third psychological need deserving of special mention is the need to restrict one's life within narrow borders. Here restricting one's ambitions is important, as is the need to take second place. Accompanying this pattern is the belittling of one's faculties, with "modesty the supreme value."²²

Horney points out that these three needs are often, though not always, found together.

²⁰ From *Self-Analysis* (W. W. Norton and Co., 1942), pp. 54-55. This summary is adapted from her *Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (Norton, 1937), chap. 6. This type of analysis is consistent with the main current of modern psychoanalytic literature, although there are differences of interpretation among different authors. On the points stressed in this article, however, there remains little basic disagreement. The relevant literature here includes such general works as Franz Alexander and others, *Psychoanalytic Therapy; Principles and Application* (Ronald Press Co., 1946); Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (Random House, 1938); Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (Farrar and Rinehart, 1941); Karl Menninger, *The Human Mind* (3d ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), and (with Jeanetta L. Menninger), *Love against Hate* (Harcourt, Brace, 1944); Harry Stack Sullivan, *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry* (Washington: The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947); and Clara Thompson, *Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development* (Heritage House, 1950). The specifically applicable literature is, of course, far more extensive. The interested reader will find an excellent selected bibliography in Menninger, *The Human Mind*, pp. 498-517, including highly useful sections on the application of psychiatry to other fields and on personology.

²¹ For a more detailed statement of the characteristics of these several patterns see Horney, *Self Analysis*, pp. 55, 56-72.

²⁰ Jump once sent to Under Secretary Appleby, under an approving note, a quotation setting forth the Quaker technique for developing "the sense of the meeting."

Likewise the classification of neurotic needs of this kind is not, by any means, firm. Those mentioned overlap with such others as the need for power, which can find expression in devotion to a cause or duty; for social recognition or prestige; for personal admiration; for personal achievement; for self-sufficiency; and for perfection and unassailability. The last Jump revealed in high degree, and subdued indications of the need for recognition appear in his active cultivation of professional ties outside government. Undoubtedly his mastery of bureaucratic negotiation, along with an awareness of his great influence on succeeding Secretaries of Agriculture and congressional committees, satisfied some need for power.

To proceed with greater self-assurance in this kind of analysis, one would need to have available a more detailed record of Jump's personal history, particularly of his emotional development, than exists. On the other hand, even a sketch of his early development suggests the probable origins of certain personality drives. His father died when he was nine. Jump is reliably reported to have shown great emotional upset at the time, and to have anxiously inquired of his mother whether a little boy could live without a father. The mother in turn was a strong personality. She left her school teaching in Baltimore soon after her husband's death and took a minor civil service position in the Treasury Department. The support of her son and infant daughter involved great hardships, and Jump had to help out with odd jobs from his earliest years. Awareness of her hardship and sacrifice led him to develop a deep attachment for his mother and a strong sense of responsibility for her. He vowed he never would leave her, and in fact she continued to live with him for many years after his marriage. His wife reports that in all those years he never spoke a harsh word to his mother. When he was on his deathbed, one of the concerns which he expressed was that he was going to have to leave his mother, who survived him.

In brief, Jump's personal history suggests the origins of great insecurity, compensated by the strongest attachment to the mother-figure. Since the mother was a strong personality it seems likely that his role was always essentially a subordinate one—in which recognition and

satisfaction came from pleasing an authoritative figure. This role would have been perpetuated in his first lowly assignment in the Department of Agriculture, which he entered at age sixteen as a messenger. Even as he moved into more responsible positions, beginning with appointment as personal assistant to Secretary Henry C. Wallace in 1921, his task was essentially that of doing the things that would please, to act with the authority of another. Since he remained in a staff capacity throughout his career, it is at least worth suggesting that the neurotic need for affection and for an alter-ego (partner), plus the need to restrict one's self-assertion rather narrowly, may be highly useful attributes for the person in a staff capacity in government.

It is noteworthy that those members of Jump's office with strong drives for personal recognition, or who would not automatically abandon other pleasures or rewards to live up to the expectations of a superior, did not tend to remain in the environment which Jump created. It has been said that his desire to lead in budgetary development caused him to bring into the office a succession of younger men of advanced professional training. Most of them remained a few years, but then left—usually with considerable emotional stress because of the strong affectionate ties which they developed with Jump. Nonetheless, the outward migration was marked. In his conversations with these men, as well as in his own experience, the writer has concluded that the basic reason (there were many specific reasons given) was the pressure which the environment created and the looming choice between a balanced existence away from the office and meeting the expectations of the office. These became increasingly incompatible as one moved upward in the organization.

Behind this pressure, always subtle rather than overt, was the fact that Jump set high expectations on others as on himself. Even worse, members of his staff felt guilty if they were less careful in their work, less exacting of themselves, than was Jump of himself. Here the ties of affection and loyalty became a basic factor in the situation. If one made a mistake or delayed an assignment when an evening or a weekend of work would have avoided it, he was letting down. Thus a member of the

staff was likely to be repeatedly torn between the need to "do a little work tonight" and his wife's or children's demand that he spend some time with them. If his personality lent itself to following Jump's own pattern, the choice would be to live up to the expectations of the organization. If not, he gave time to his family but was inwardly disturbed over the possible consequences of his dereliction.

This was no light matter. There is little question in the writer's mind that the same perfectionism and untiring sacrifice of his private life which made Jump a great staff man also lost him and the department the services of many well-trained men. The pace was too rough, the impact upon more rationally determined philosophies of life untenable. Since they had good training, they had other alternatives that offered adequate professional opportunities, without "quite so much of the B&F pressure," as it was repeatedly put to the writer. One is forced to the conclusion, therefore, that the personality attributes that made Jump an invaluable man also had the detrimental effect of losing him assistance which he wanted and needed.

In this same context, it should be stressed that the culture of bureaucracy—a quite tangible cultural milieu—engulfed Jump early in life. It conditioned his outlook and feelings in many ways. This was not the case, however, for the younger university-trained men. They came from an environment which more often than not put emphasis on goal-oriented values—i.e. on good *vs.* bad public policy. Many of them came to the department because of its liberal orientation during the thirties and early forties. These persons, in B&F and outside it, sometimes felt a sense of impatience with Jump because of his tendency—as they saw it—to put protection of the department, careful attention to strategy, and long-range appraisals of the mood of Congress ahead of vigorous pursuit of goals they thought obviously desirable. This again caused some discontent.

These observations at least raise the question of whether or not advanced university training, particularly with emphasis on the critical evaluation of public policy and on the policy-making obligations of administrators, may not tend to unsuit a person for sustained staff work—perhaps even render him restless in any per-

manent civil service role. Persons who have political convictions themselves clearly become uncomfortable when the goals which they seek are abandoned in favor of others they find unacceptable. Thus the idea of loyal devotion to changing administrations may be open to question, unless the personality of the person is so oriented that it finds adequate expression in identification with the prestige of an office, in the subtle skills of manipulation, in approving pats on the back by a superior, and in the avoidance of criticism and conflict. If the person demands widespread personal recognition, asserts himself with respect to his convictions, or needs the satisfaction of wielding obvious personal power he should certainly be steered away from staff offices, and he may not long survive in government service in any case except as he finds outlets for these needs outside his job.

It may be that one way for such persons to survive, without serious frustrations, is to keep their lives in adequate balance—to be positively concerned with preserving their free time for family, avocation, and prestige-giving activities away from the office. But the culture of bureaucracy is not sympathetic to people who openly resist invasion of their private lives by alleged obligations of their jobs. It suggests less than "100 percent loyalty"; it bespeaks a latent criticism of the constant worker. Even worse, it attacks a fundamental tenet of American culture in general and of bureaucratic culture in particular—that work is a moral virtue.

To summarize, it seems probable that there is a type of personality which lends itself particularly well to staff work. This is not to say that other types will not succeed in it, but the writer doubts greatly that the person with a strong underlying drive for power, for personal recognition, or for self-sufficiency and independence is best cast in this role. It is not that the extroverted, self-dramatizing sort of person is inherently superior in any way to his more repressed, compulsive brother. Quite the contrary. Both types are essential to government. As one psychiatrist suggested to the writer, "If you've got a good solid introvert, for heaven's sake don't try to change him. He's invaluable to an organization!" Our problem is rather to differentiate with more sophisti-

cation than we have so far shown among the attributes which are most valuable in particular kinds of executive positions. The current belief that these are the same for every kind of responsible administrative position is untenable.

That for which we seek in government is essentially variety, each type of person to be carefully husbanded and carefully placed as his attributes mature and become more evident. Perhaps, to this end, some advance testing for basic personality formations will in time prove useful. It is to the development of such tests that a series of personal histories of the kind ventured here might make a contribution. But such testing will be a far cry from the faltering use of "personal interviews" in current recruitment practice—in which men and women who have proved themselves to have ability and great potential usefulness in four years of college work may be shunted aside after an hour's group interview. The premium thus put on the fast "good impression," on the demonstration of extroverted tendencies, and on careful dress is doing government a great disservice.²³ It is highly

doubtful that a youthful Jump would have "made the grade."

The net result is that in personal appraisal we remain today where we have always been. Experienced administrators have little confidence in personality rating scales or other current efforts at written evaluations of performance. They want to see the person. They have greater confidence in their "intuition" than in anything students of the subject have yet contributed to "objectifying" judgments about personal promise.

No one has stated better than Jump the poverty of current techniques of recruitment and evaluation, and the need for seeking in new directions. In the final talk which the writer had with him, a few days before his death, we were reviewing the careers of persons we had both known. Some had been surprising successes, despite weaknesses in their apparent equipment. Noting that there was still a long way to go in discovering the kind of person who can build a successful government career, he summarized forty-one years of experience in one sentence—"The paper record isn't worth a damn."

²³ There is some evidence that business and industry may be doing themselves a similar disservice, not only in recruiting but in promoting only certain "executive types," willing to conform to any demands the "company" may make, to subordinate family to business, to

be always smooth in interpersonal relations. The "character" in any form is taboo. See William H. Whyte, Jr., "Wives of Management," 44 *Fortune* 86-88, 204, 206 (Oct. 1951) and "The Corporation and the Wife," 44 *Fortune* 109-11, 150, 152, 155-58 (Nov. 1951).

Administration Must Serve Human Beings

There is first of all a science of administration. . . . The government of societies is also an art of which the techniques and formulas should be known by those responsible for its administration.

But neither the scientific spirit nor techniques is enough. First of all, we must bring into view the human relations upon which the administration of public as well as private enterprises is based. Administration must serve human beings grouped in society, and not the human beings serve administration. . . .

That which gives the reward to the efforts of our Institute and assures the success of its work is that we all understand that we cannot limit ourselves to being scholars or technicians. We are above all men determined to improve the lot of our fellows, and to act for the satisfaction of all who work, who suffer, and who have a right to honest, efficient, and humane administration.

—René Cassin, vice-chairman, Conseil d'Etat of France, Presidential address to the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, The Hague, July 24, 1954.

A Critical Look at the Budget Process

By PERCIVAL F. BRUNDAGE

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THE present budget system of the federal government is thirty-three years old. It dates from the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. General Dawes was the first director of the Bureau of the Budget. At that time the bureau was a part of the Treasury Department, although General Dawes reported directly to the President. The bureau is still very close to the financial branch of the government but acts as a part of the Executive Office of the President. It does not initiate policy but endeavors to carry out the policy decisions of President and Cabinet in reviewing and integrating all programs of the departments.

Our budget problems today are much more complex than those faced by General Dawes back in 1921. Perhaps a comparison of budget figures for the fiscal years 1921 and 1954 may be of interest in this connection.

1921 1954
(In billions)

Total budget receipts	\$ 5.5	\$ 64.6
Total budget expenditures	5.0	67.6
Surplus	0.5
Deficit	3.0
Public debt	24.0	270.8

The value of the dollar has changed greatly since 1921 and our country has increased in population, in productivity, and in national income. In order to make the 1921 expenditures more comparable with those for 1954 I have multiplied the expenditures of the earlier year for various purposes by the percentage increase in the gross national product.

NOTE: This article is based on an address to the Washington, D. C. Chapter of the Society, Sept. 15, 1954.

	1921	adjusted ¹	1954
Expenditures other than protection and interest	\$2,155	\$ 9,719	\$13,173
Interest on the public debt	999	4,505	6,371
Protection	1,837	8,285	48,035
Total	\$4,991	\$22,509	\$67,578

The differences between columns 2 and 3 above give a rough indication of the changes in thinking about functions of government and the changes in world conditions since 1921.

I

LET us now take a critical look at the federal budget process. There are three different points of view from which we can approach it. First there is the businessman's approach. He looks at it as he would look at his own personal budget or that of his business. The first thing he considers in preparing a budget is his gross income—how much can he sell and how much can he charge for his products? Or correspondingly, how much can we expect to collect in taxes?

With the receipts side determined by the best estimates he can make, he then sets his production schedule and classifies his expenditures in the order of priority. His prime cost comes first, the factory payroll, the cost of running the plant, then the selling and admin-

¹ Actual figures for 1921 multiplied by the ratio of gross national product in 1954 to that in 1921. (Ratio of \$359.9 billion in 1954 to \$79.8 billion estimated for 1921 = 4.51.)

istrative expenses. In government these are the cost of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches other than defense, foreign aid, and interest charges. These latter might be called police and fire protection past and present.

When the businessman has matched these expenditures against his receipts, if he finds a deficit he combs over his expenses to see where he can best cut costs, for he realizes that he cannot go to the banks very often to finance a deficit. If he has a surplus he can then decide how much to spend for new construction, for the purchase of equipment he has long wanted to get, for research and the development of new products, or for dividends (tax reductions). This is the realistic way to approach the budget process from the businessman's point of view.

A second and different approach is that of the entrepreneur or promoter. He looks on our country as a magnificent field for development. We have only begun, he would say, to take full advantage of our natural resources. There are millions of acres of land to be reclaimed and improved, mineral resources to be developed, floods to be controlled, harbors to be dredged, thousands of miles of super-highways to be built, medical research to be encouraged, low-cost housing to be built, hundreds of schools and administrative buildings to be erected, public parks and playgrounds to be enlarged. The entrepreneur calls attention to the tremendous increases in our population, in our gross national product, and illustrates his program by the public utility industry which he says has grown by leaps and bounds because it has been willing to go heavily into debt to finance expansion. He is quite willing to have the debt limit raised or removed entirely. This is a very appealing approach to many segments of our population. Some labor union leaders have embraced it 100 per cent and do not seem to be worried if it also entails inflation so long as wages go up annually. Their economists have prepared a plausible philosophy about the advantages of a "reasonable amount" of inflation, 2 or 3 per cent annually, and believe that our productivity will increase even more rapidly if labor gets the full benefit.

A third and still different approach to the budget process is that of a manager. He realizes that the various segments of our economy rarely move in one direction at the same time

and with the same speed. His responsibility is to keep the ship on an even keel and not allow the extremes in either direction to dominate policy. He is forced to consider the expenditures first—the necessary and the desirable ones—and then to see how close he can come to raising revenues enough to cover them. However, it is more important to keep the economy going—on as stable a basis as possible and preferably with a balanced budget. But he tries to keep the economy balanced whether or not the budget is balanced. The psychological as well as the financial and economic implications of budget decisions he believes are becoming increasingly important. When he comes to consider the defense budget and the foreign aid program in particular, it is not the minimum amount that can be spent and still carry out our programs that determines the decision. A good manager has to provide reasonable protection for all of the known factors plus some leeway for the unexpected. Yet he must come close enough to a balanced budget, based on receipts computed under reasonable tax rates, to justify the confidence of all of the different groups in the country.

Your representatives in the Budget Bureau must consider all of these different points of view, but it is the primary duty of a budget officer to examine closely and rather skeptically all of the proposed expenditures of government. In dealing with departments that have proposed programs for new spending we must advance the conservative viewpoint of the businessman. But we cannot unduly restrict research in new fields like atomic reactors and guided missiles or improvements in public health services.

Many businessmen have been loud in their demands that the government get out of some of the fields that it has entered during the past twenty years, particularly where it competes with private business. But when businesslike proposals have been made, such as the recent contract for construction of an electric power plant in West Memphis by private capital, a terrific political attack is launched, seemingly with little regard for the true facts.

The present administration—and the Budget Bureau is an arm of the President—has announced its intention to practice economy, reduce expenditures, and balance the budget as

speedily as possible, without sacrificing the adequate defense or welfare of the country; and at the same time to give the public the benefit of part of the economies through tax reduction.

We must admit frankly that taxes have been and still are too high, and we want to continue to reduce them as rapidly as possible. But we must also recognize that no economy can be successfully stabilized so long as there are recurrent wars and continual threats of war. If present tensions are to continue for many years to come, as seems quite likely, we shall have to pick our way cautiously along a narrow ridge with an abyss on either side, one an inflationary chasm and the other depression or military defeat. It will take a steady head and resolute determination to carry us through. The \$64 question is what kind of a defense structure can be erected that is reasonably effective under present circumstances, will be economically bearable, and can be maintained, if necessary, over a relatively long period of time. We must defend a way of life, as well as lives and property. We recognize that a continuation of irresponsible and unwise fiscal policies could play into the hands of those who hope to undermine and destroy the United States without engaging it in actual war.

I would like to return for a moment to the expenditures for fiscal 1954 just ended and compare them with the appropriations (new obligatory authority) for the same year, and with the midyear estimates for fiscal 1955 which were released on September 14, 1954. In the following table I have attempted to classify them rather roughly under four main headings.

First comes the cost of running the federal government. These expenditures have been drastically reduced as a result of strenuous ef-

forts of the administration, and how much farther they can be cut is somewhat doubtful. At least, I feel that we cannot expect any large savings here.

Second comes interest, which is higher because of the increase in the public debt.

Third is the category of social and other benefits to a very large part of our total population. It includes education, grants to states for highways, schools, and hospitals, medical research, agricultural loans and price supports, etc. In what direction these expenditures may go, whether upward or downward, depends on Congress and the people back home. The Budget Bureau and the Treasury Department must operate under present legislation and these expenditures are not controllable to any large extent by the budget process. New obligatory authority has declined but expenditures are expected to be larger, principally because of increased agricultural subsidies under prior legislation, increased veterans benefits granted by Congress, and rapid liquidation of housing loans in fiscal year 1954 resulting in a net credit of \$621 million in that year.

Fourth, and most important monetarily, is "protection." I like this word better than "security," which we can't have in the absolute sense, or "defense," which no one knows how to get. Here new obligatory authority has decreased \$6 billion and expenditures are reduced \$5 billion without any sacrifice of our protection.

For several significant reasons the 1954 budget, as revised by the new administration, represented a turning point in federal budgetary policy.

a. For the first time since hostilities began in Korea new authorizations to spend were less than budget receipts. This was a reversal of the experience of the past several years,

Purpose	1954 Actual				1955—Midyear Review				
	New obliga-tional authority	Expendi-tures	New obliga-tional authority	Expendi-tures	Estimate				
	(In millions)								
Cost of operating the government	\$ 2,326	\$ 2,008	\$ 2,235	\$ 2,064					
Interest on the public debt	6,371	6,371	6,550	6,550					
Benefits	13,415	11,165	13,185	12,352					
Protection	40,364	48,035	34,580	43,002					
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>					
	\$62,476	\$67,579	\$56,550	\$63,968					

during which annual authorizations to spend ran substantially in excess of the revenues then being provided by the tax system.

b. For the first time since 1948 new authorizations to spend were substantially less than budget expenditures in 1954. This lower level of spending authority points toward lower expenditures in future years. New obligational authority lower than the year's expenditures and receipts is an essential starting point on the road toward a balanced budget.

c. For the first time since fiscal year 1948, budget expenditures in 1954 were less than those of the preceding fiscal year.

Expenditures for protection will be less in 1955 than in 1954, but the reductions are selective, reflecting a dynamic long-range plan recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will spend more on our air power next year than in any year since World War II. We will spend more on continental defense than in any year of our history. We will continue to have more than a million men in the Army and a Navy second to none in size and strength. Expenditure reductions have resulted from planning the most effective application of our growing number of nuclear weapons; from improved management and better balanced procurement; from the growing strength of our allies; and from the termination of active hostilities in Korea.

As a result of such planning, we hope to move from the crisis atmosphere of several years past into a period of sustained defense which will not be incompatible with a normal prosperous economic life.

II

AFTER the foregoing analysis of the budgetary position, I should like to turn to the budget process itself. It is always desirable to take stock from time to time. Procedures inevitably tend to become cumbersome and stereotyped. We receive many criticisms from outside and we are always trying to improve the process from within.

The following factors make the usual budgetary procedures of commercial companies difficult, if not impossible, for the federal government to follow. To begin with, we have the jealously guarded separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial

branches of the government. Close cooperation between the legislative and executive branches is essential, but during recent hearings I have attended in Congress it is quite apparent that many members of the legislative branch feel frustrated in their efforts to control the budget expenditures. It is a long and arduous process from the start of the preparation of the budget figures in June of one year until the following year to which they apply—over twelve months to the beginning of the fiscal year and twenty-four months to its close. Many things can happen in that period. Those of you who have had commercial experience realize how rapidly it is customary to move in the readjustment of schedules and the revamping of forecasts. This is much more difficult in government. The commercial budget is a flexible budget. The budgeted expenses are necessarily changed as the sales increase or decrease. While department heads in government and the Budget Bureau attempt to inject some flexibility through the periodic apportionment and allotment of appropriations, it is necessarily limited. In a business budget the forecast is usually treated as a target rather than a ceiling. There is nothing illegal about exceeding an appropriation approved by the board of directors. In the government this would be an illegal act.

The profit motive in business is a powerful incentive to keep expenditures within the budgetary amounts. In government the incentives seem to be principally for spending. There are many pressures inspired by zeal of all kinds, by educators, by sociologists, by social workers, by scientists, by leaders in the medical and other fields, as well as by politicians. Individually, these projects are usually constructive and desirable, but when added together our economy just cannot afford them.

Another problem is the tremendous size of the amounts involved. If we manage to save a million dollars by careful analysis and control of the operating expenditures of a department we may be shocked to find that some program such as the agricultural price support program has entailed an increased expenditure of 100 million dollars more than budgeted, which is entirely outside our control. This can be very discouraging.

The appropriation procedures seem difficult

and unwieldy to a businessman. When the Budget Bureau and the departmental staffs have arrived at their final budget estimates for the ensuing fiscal year and they have been approved by the President and included in his budget message, we have to start all over again with Congress. The House Committee on Appropriations will go over every single item and may make substantial cuts. These are later reviewed by the Senate Appropriations Committee and some of the cuts may be restored or further cuts may be made. Under present procedures the expenditures are explained and justified entirely by the departments concerned and the representatives of the Budget Bureau are only occasionally consulted during this legislative process. It is, of course, natural and necessary for the departments to assume responsibility for supporting their budget requests. However, it is much more difficult than in a business concern where approval by the board of directors and the president ends the matter.

The separation of the legislative branch into the House and Senate, each with its own prerogatives, while constitutionally desirable, creates almost as many budgetary problems as the separation of the legislative from the executive branch of the government.

Then there is the problem of overlapping fields between departments. Many difficulties in budgeting as well as in operating arise from this cause. Each of the departments and agencies is in many respects independent and self-sufficient and must initiate its own programs. They are all, however, within the administration and must integrate their programs within the framework of its general policies and budgetary resources.

The House Appropriations Committee and Mr. John Taber, its chairman, in particular, have been long concerned with the problem of unobligated appropriations carried forward from year to year. There are strong arguments for cancelling such authorizations as have not been obligated before the close of the fiscal year for which they were authorized. Mr. Taber prepared for inclusion in the Supplemental Appropriation Act approved in August a section, No. 1311, which he feels will contribute greatly to a better control by his committee of unobligated authorizations. This sec-

tion provides that no amount shall be recorded as an obligation of the government unless it is supported by documentary evidence.

This will undoubtedly be helpful, but many believe that it is necessary to place annual limitations against all appropriations, both current and prior. In addition they favor—and here I join them—a single appropriation bill to cover both revenue and expenditures and what is called an item veto for the President. Such a single appropriation bill would commit Congress to approve all of the authorized expenditures in toto, matched with a revenue bill to raise revenues for their payment.

There is rather strong feeling in Congress both for and against a single appropriation bill. Congress had some experience with what was called a "one-package budget bill" in 1950. This was discontinued in 1951 because it was felt that it favored the "spenders" rather than the "savers," which was the reverse of what its proponents intended. The package budget was also said to have worked against intensive congressional analysis and discussion, and it was feared it might lead to a transfer of power from Congress to the President, if the total expenditures exceeded receipts and he were given the power to make percentage cuts. While some of these objections are valid I do not feel that they are conclusive. I feel it would be definitely helpful toward balancing the budget if the total authorized expenditures to be approved should be hooked up with the revenue measure providing the funds to pay for them.

The English and Canadian practice in this respect is superior to ours, in that the revenue budget is acted upon after the expenditure budget has been approved.

The item veto would, of course, give the President much better control over authorizations and appropriations which were contrary to his program and which would throw the budget out of balance. At present he has to weigh the merits of desirable portions of a bill against the ill-effects of undesirable portions, and must sign or reject the bill as a whole and not certain parts of it.

Congressman John Phillips, a member of the House Committee on Appropriations, has suggested the following improvements among others:

1. Inauguration of a report to Congress every thirty or sixty days on the outlook for the relationship between appropriations and revenues, in the light of congressional action then taking place.
2. Creating a small joint committee on appropriations and expenditures, and including in its responsibilities the study of reports of the General Accounting Office.
3. More thorough investigations by the Appropriations Committees.
4. Better staffing of Appropriations Committees.
5. A floor schedule for appropriation bills, contemplating that all bills be finished by the end of June.
6. A public record of congressional votes on all appropriation measures.

Another helpful suggestion has been that reports from all legislative committees of Congress involving expenditures must be accompanied by an estimate of the cost of the projects.

The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, of which Meyer Kestnbaum is now chairman, is reviewing the contributions by the federal government to the states for all kinds of purposes. This review is most desirable. Contributions for public assistance, for highways, for schools (including school lunches), etc., add up to a very considerable total, and this should be reexamined from time to time to see how much should be supported by the state and local governments and how much should be borne by the federal government.

The first Hoover Commission recommended in 1949 that Congress undertake a complete survey of the appropriation structure and divide the budget estimates into two categories—current operating expenditures and capital outlays. Beardsley Ruml and others have advocated this separation. The published budget report contains estimates of the total amount of the government expenditures which might be treated as capital items under business practice for the fiscal year 1954.

Net additions to federal assets during the past fiscal year were estimated in January to amount to approximately \$25 billion. They actually amounted to about \$1.6 billion less. Depreciation and amortization on assets in use during the year must, of course, be provided for if these additions should be capitalized, and equipment consumed must be written off. These together would amount to roughly \$15 billion or a net difference of around \$8.4 bil-

lion. This represents largely accumulations of military equipment, strategic and atomic stockpiles, and agricultural surplus commodities. From the standpoint of a going commercial concern, therefore, it seems pretty clear that the federal government did not operate in the red in 1954. However, I want to make it clear that I am not advocating at present a change in accounting practices in this respect because it would involve many problems, including estimates of the realizable or usable value of our working assets. There would be definite advantages in the adoption of an accrual basis of accounting, but the expense of a changeover would be considerable and there are strong arguments for continuing the simpler checks-issued basis of reporting.

The so-called consolidated cash budget, combining trust funds, for fiscal 1954 indicates that the cash withdrawals exceeded cash deposits by only \$200 million. This, of course, is a small amount and means that the reduction in total government expenditures during the past fiscal year, though considerable, had a negligible impact on the economy of this country as a whole. The tax reductions placed funds in the hands of taxpayers for use as they saw fit and therefore gave a stimulus to the economy which, in my opinion, was much more valuable psychologically than the amounts involved.

III

IN CONCLUSION let me say that the net result of my critical survey of the budget process is not discouraging. On the contrary I feel we are making definite progress. Savings accomplished in the government's economy campaign of a year and a half are very substantial. Just to mention two—a reduction of over 7,000 in the nationwide fleet of automobiles will reduce annual maintenance charges by more than \$2 million. A reduction of office space leased by the government through the General Services Administration will save approximately \$8 million annually in rent. Total savings are in the billions.

The staff of the Budget Bureau is made up of experienced and extremely capable people. They are alert for improvements as well as economies. I have been tremendously impressed by their attitude and also by the excellent cooperation of the departmental staffs and the legislative branch of the government.

The General Manager Idea for Large Cities

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A NEW managerial idea is taking hold in the large cities of the United States. This idea is that the administration of large city governments requires general managerial direction and that this requirement can best be met by establishing under the mayor a general manager who will, in greater or less degree, be the city government's second in administrative command. The general manager plan thus builds upon the strong-mayor tradition as the most widespread form of city government in the United States. By marrying the manager idea with the idea of the elected chief executive, the general manager plan preserves the office of mayor as the center of political leadership and responsibility. In large cities this center is widely regarded as indispensable to effective government.

The general manager plan may be regarded either as a competitor of the council manager idea or as a more mature form of the manager idea, reflecting the judgment in the larger cities that the council manager plan represents an unnecessary surrender of the values of leadership and accountability found in the institution of the elected chief executive. The general manager or mayor manager plan, its proponents emphasize, captures the advantages of the council manager plan without the risks of abandoning the elected chief executive. An effective manager, they believe, is no less likely to be chosen by a mayor than by a city council.

The council manager plan has not found acceptance in the large cities of the United States. Cincinnati, the largest city using the plan, has a population of a half million. Of the seventeen other cities having a population of a half

million or more, only one city—Cleveland—has ever adopted the plan, and it was abandoned there more than twenty years ago. In the last decade (perhaps even longer), no large city has given serious consideration to the adoption of the council manager plan.

The literature of the council manager movement does not provide an answer to the question: why has the plan failed to find support in large cities? In fact, the literature does not tell us much about the ecology of the council manager plan in adoptions and operations. Why, for example, are half of all the council manager cities to be found in six states (California, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia)? Does the council manager plan find acceptance primarily in particular social, economic, and political environments? Does it, for example, find greatest acceptance and operate most successfully in one-party or in "non-partisan" constituencies? Is the affinity between the council manager plan and small and middle-sized cities the result of the plan's suitability for the management of the particular governmental problems to be found in cities of such size? Is the council manager plan particularly attractive to cities which are growing rapidly in size or to those which are declining in population and resources? To these and other questions about the council manager plan we do not yet have the answers.¹

The Large Cities Turn toward the Mayor Manager Plan

EIGHT large cities (Boston, Los Angeles, Louisville, Newark, New Orleans, New

NOTE: This article is based upon a panel paper presented at the annual meeting, American Political Science Association, September, 1954.

¹ For a program of research in this field, see "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager Government," in Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Political Behavior, Social Science Research Council, "Research in Political Behavior," 46 *American Political Science Review* 1009-15 (December, 1952).

York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco) have now established some kind of general managerial assistance for the mayor. In two others (Chicago and Detroit) proposals for such general managerial arrangements have been made.

This new managerial trend in large cities has not resulted from an organized effort by municipal reformers with a symmetrical design for the improvement of city government. In fact, this new form of the manager idea in city government has not yet acquired a distinctive label. Some observers call it the mayor manager plan, to emphasize its contrast with the council manager plan; others call it the mayor administrator plan; and still others name it the general manager plan.

The general manager idea for cities began its governmental history in San Francisco in 1932, when charter revision movement established the office of chief administrative officer. This office represented a compromise solution between those who urged a council manager form and those who supported the retention of the strong mayor form. The plan was not widely noticed, but it has prevailed to the general satisfaction of the electorate. In 1938 New York City's new charter established the office of deputy mayor, an office which developed more as a center of legislative and political assistance to the mayor than as a center of managerial aid. In 1941, Lent D. Upson proposed a general manager under the mayor for the city of Detroit, but the proposal was not accepted. In 1948, Louisville began a related experiment with the appointment of a city consultant-administrator who serves as general managerial assistant to the mayor. In 1951, Los Angeles established a city administrative officer. In the same year, Philadelphia's new charter took a long step forward in developing the general manager idea by establishing the office of managing director with substantial powers. In 1953, New Orleans adopted a new charter which established the office of chief administrative officer, with powers similar to but greater than those of Philadelphia's managing director. In the same year, Boston established a director of administrative services and Newark adopted a new charter which established the office of business administrator under the mayor, the option under the New Jersey

statutes closest to the general manager idea. In 1954, New York City established the office of city administrator, with Luther Gulick the first incumbent. And in September, 1954, the staff report to the Chicago Charter Revision Commission recommended the adoption of the general manager plan for that city.²

Thus the experiment begun in San Francisco over twenty years ago has captured civic interest and has led to official action in an impressive portion of the large cities. Why has this happened? Several explanations may be suggested:

1. The council manager plan had proved to be unacceptable in large city environments, but the values of the managerial idea were still sought in some more attractive structural form.

2. The office of mayor—an elected chief executive who is the center of energy and of public leadership and the focus of responsibility for policy and performance—had become too important an asset in large cities to be exchanged for the speculative values of legislative supremacy and a city manager as represented in the council manager plan.

3. The mayor manager plan fits comfortably and easily into the American political system: it preserves the elected chief executive; it keeps the mayoralty as the focus of the party battle; it emphasizes the values of integration, hierarchy, and professional management, all made familiar doctrine by a half-century of adminis-

² Accounts of these developments are scattered and fragmentary. In addition to the charters of the several cities, see Richard S. Childs, *Appointive Municipal Administrators under Mayors; A Review of the Precedents* (Citizens Union Research Foundation, Inc., 5 Beckman St., New York City 38, 1953), 10 pp.; Boston Municipal Research Bureau, *Highlights of the Reorganization Ordinance* (Bulletin No. 180, Dec. 29, 1953); Charles P. Farnsley, "Louisville's Mayor-Administrator Plan," 68 *American City* 116-17 (Jan., 1953); Bert W. Levit, "San Francisco's Unique Charter," 34 *National Municipal Review* 273-77, 286 (June, 1945); Los Angeles Commission for Reorganization of the City Government, *Final Report* (April, 1953), 21 pp.; Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York, *Four Steps to Better Government of New York City: A Plan for Action*, Part 1 (Sept. 28, 1953), 136 pp.; Part 2 (Feb. 1, 1954), 102 pp. Charlton F. Chute prepared a useful survey of these developments, "Modern Ideas on Administrative Assistants for the Mayor in Large American Cities," for the Chicago Charter Revision Commission which will be summarized in a forthcoming report of that commission.

trative reorganizations in national, state, and municipal governments and by the doctrine of the council manager movement itself.

Emerging Elements of the General Manager Idea

THE idea of a general manager serving under the mayor has not been a pre-packaged solution developed as finished doctrine by municipal reformers. Rather, its evolution has been experimental, each application being worked out in relation to local experience and governmental conditions, and varying with the boldness or caution of local leadership. There are several discernible trends in the successive adoptions, however. These can be briefly stated as follows:

1. The general manager is increasingly made more clearly the managerial agent of the mayor, "The mayor's man." In San Francisco in 1932 the manager was made virtually irremovable, but under 1953-54 provisions in New Orleans and New York City the manager holds office at the pleasure of the mayor.

2. As the manager is made more responsible to the mayor, he tends to be given more power—to approach more nearly the status of second in administrative command. In New Orleans and Philadelphia, the cities which represent the most full-bodied application of the general manager idea, the manager is given, for example, the power to appoint and remove the heads of most of the city departments with the approval of the mayor.

3. There is a continued ambivalence in deciding whether the general manager's authority and responsibility should center upon the "staff" or upon the "line" agencies and activities of the city government.

In almost every instance the manager is given primary responsibility for administrative planning and for other organization and methods work. In Los Angeles and New Orleans he has responsibility for budget preparation and execution; in Philadelphia and New York these activities are not under the manager's jurisdiction. In no city does the manager directly supervise the personnel agency. In New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia the "line" agencies are the manager's

major responsibility. The two extremes are represented by Los Angeles, where the manager's responsibilities are focused upon the management functions (except personnel), and by Philadelphia, where the manager's powers are centered upon the "line" agencies.

4. There is some tendency to create a new and smaller cabinet institution under the mayor, consisting of the general manager and the heads of the "staff" agencies. This is particularly the case in Philadelphia and New York. The heads of the "line" agencies, when they function as a cabinet (as they do in Philadelphia), do so in a meeting presided over by the manager.

Variations in the Office and Powers of the General Manager in Five Large Cities

THE variety as well as the trends in the development of the general manager idea in the large cities of the United States may perhaps best be seen through a more specific description of the office and the powers conferred upon it in Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

Title: In San Francisco and New Orleans the manager is called chief administrative officer; in Los Angeles, city administrative officer; in Philadelphia, managing director; in New York, city administrator.

Appointment: In every instance, the manager is appointed by the mayor. Only in Los Angeles is council approval required.

Term: In San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and New York, no term is specified. In Philadelphia the term of the manager is four years, corresponding to the term of the mayor appointing him.

Removal: In New Orleans and New York the mayor may remove the manager. In Los Angeles, the mayor may remove the manager, but the approval of the council is required. In Philadelphia the mayor must prefer charges; the manager may appeal his removal to the Civil Service Commission which may award him compensation but may not restore him. In San Francisco the mayor may not remove; the manager is subject to recall in an election, or the legislative body may remove him by a two-thirds vote. In Los Angeles and New Orleans the council may also remove the man-

ager—in Los Angeles by a two-thirds vote and in New Orleans by a majority vote of all members.

Powers of the Manager: The powers of the managers may be described in three categories: (1) the power to appoint and remove heads of city agencies; (2) the power to supervise city administrative operations; (3) the power to provide general advice and assistance to the mayor.

1. *To appoint and remove heads of agencies:* In Philadelphia, New Orleans, and San Francisco, the managers appoint and remove the heads of specified city departments and agencies. In San Francisco the manager does not need the mayor's approval for such appointments or removals; in Philadelphia and New Orleans the mayor's approval is required. In New Orleans the manager's power to appoint and remove extends to the heads of all but two city departments (law and civil service); in Philadelphia it includes all but finance, law, and personnel. In neither of these two cities does the power to appoint and remove include members of boards or commissions. In San Francisco, the power extends to departments specified by name in the charter; such departments constitute about half of the city agencies.

In neither Los Angeles nor New York does the manager have the power to appoint or remove heads of departments.

2. *To supervise city administrative operations:* In San Francisco the power of the manager to supervise is confined to the departments specifically assigned to him by the charter. In Los Angeles the manager's opportunities for supervision flow solely from his role as city budget officer. In Philadelphia the manager's power to supervise is largely confined to the departments whose heads he appoints, but some more general supervision flows from his powers to perform the administrative analysis function in all city agencies.

In New Orleans the manager has more general supervisory authority. He supervises not only his own subordinate agencies (which include most of the city agencies), but he also gives "general oversight" to law, civil service, and the City Planning Commission (which are outside his appointing and removal authority), prescribes standards of administrative practice

to be followed by all agencies and boards, prepares and supervises the operating and capital budgets, surveys the organization and procedures of all agencies and boards, and may require reports from any or all of them.

In New York City the city administrator, although lacking any power to appoint or remove, has a broad supervisory assignment. Under the direction of the mayor, he "shall supervise and coordinate the work of all agencies under the jurisdiction of the mayor" except law, investigation, budget, the construction coordinator, and boards, commissions (which include personnel), and authorities. He may convene heads of agencies singly or collectively, procure information and reports, require the keeping of management records, conduct work studies, and establish management standards for most, if not all, city agencies.

3. *The power to provide general advice and assistance to the mayor:* In Philadelphia and New York the manager is under a special obligation to serve as general management adviser to the mayor. In Philadelphia the managing director is required to report periodically to the mayor concerning the affairs of the city government (not merely the affairs of his own departments), and he is authorized to make recommendations on matters concerning the affairs of the whole city government. In New York the city administrator is required to "prepare annual and all such other reports as the mayor shall require," and to "analyze and report to the mayor concerning impending policy decisions affecting the management of the city and the agencies." He is also directed to "maintain liaison with civic and community groups on matters of governmental management."

In both Philadelphia and New York the manager derives special status from cabinet arrangements, established by the charter in Philadelphia and by the mayor's action in New York. In each city there is a small top-level cabinet group meeting weekly with the mayor, in which the manager plays a central role.

The managers in the other three cities have no explicit responsibility to serve as the general adviser to the mayor on management matters. In these cities, the manager's role in this respect is implicit, if it exists at all. In San Francisco it would seem difficult to join such a

role with that of an almost autonomous manager. In New Orleans it would seem to be a logical and natural development. In Los Angeles, it would appear to be a more confined but possible development.

*The Future Course of the
Mayor Manager Plan*

THE invention and recent growth of the general manager idea in large cities is a product of many influences. Some of these influences would seem to be of reasonably permanent rather than transient character. The larger cities of the United States have developed complex administrative establishments which require strengthened central managerial leadership, direction, and coordination. These cities have also, almost without exception, developed an increasing reliance upon the elected chief executive—a mayor with extensive powers to appoint, to remove, and to direct the heads of administrative agencies—as the main institution of governmental leadership and accountability. The electoral contest for this office has become the primary instrument of popular control of the city government and the main occasion for public education and participation in city affairs. The office of mayor in large cities has, in addition, become more important as a prize in the party battle, its possession one of the significant keys to state and even national party power. It would seem unlikely that any large city would abandon such a governmental and political asset.

But if the institution of the "strong" mayor in large cities has come to stay, then it would also seem that such mayors, no less than the President, need managerial help. The mayor manager idea is a response to this felt need in the large cities. In this sense, the mayor manager plan is in the mainstream of the administrative doctrine heralded by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937, and reaffirmed by the Hoover Commission's later studies of the national government. The central idea of these studies, and dozens of their counterparts in the states, has been to strengthen the position of the elected chief executive in his political and administrative leadership.

The mayor manager plan is likely to dominate the course of large city administrative reorganizations for the next several years. The council manager plan is not likely to break into the large city league, because this plan does not represent an accommodation to either the political or the managerial requirements of the large cities. The emergence of the mayor manager plan has breached the monopolistic claim of the council manager plan to the managerial virtues by presenting the new and strong competition of an alternative manager plan.

Not only is the mayor manager plan likely to hold its own and to extend its scope to most of the largest cities, but it is also probable that it will become an attractive solution for many (perhaps most) of the one hundred and five cities with 100,000 population or more. In contrast with the council manager plan, the mayor manager plan is elastic in its formal arrangements, and it can thus respond more easily to local priorities, customs, and personalities. To the strong mayor cities, it offers an evolutionary transition, buttressing rather than discarding the values which have been built up around the leadership of the elected chief executive. To these cities, the mayor manager plan offers the same managerial gains as does the council manager plan, but at much less risk. The strategic and tactical advantages of such an offer in the political world can hardly be exaggerated.

The mayor manager plan will, as it evolves toward its own institutionalization, be confronted with dilemmas which can now be only partially anticipated. The plan may ultimately acquire its own protective guild of practitioners and advocates, transforming it into an inelastic plan unresponsive to the changing needs of the cities. It may be drowned in a few dramatic "failures."

The mayor manager idea will probably encounter its severest test in the effort to give the manager sufficient power to provide him with adequate leverage to infuse the values of professional management into the administration of a large city government. Philadelphia and New Orleans have made the clearest and strongest effort to insure this result. The Devoreux Josephs Commission, in the most complete formulation of the mayor manager plan

(*Four Steps to Better Government of New York City, 1953-54*), proposed still greater strength for the manager while making him also more clearly the mayor's administrative agent. The range of variation in managerial power is wide among the cities using the mayor manager idea. The trend in official action and civic opinion—particularly on the manager's appointing power—is not conclusive, but it seems to run toward the grant of greater managerial leverage.

The mayor manager plan will also encounter, perhaps early in its development, the politics-administration dilemma which increasingly bedevils the council manager plan in operation. Can the general manager be at once both a professional administrator and the mayor's second in administrative command? That is, can he be (with the mayor) the effective maker and protagonist of policy proposals which are certain to be controversial without sacrificing his professional managerial status? This dilemma plagues the council manager plan even more deeply (because council manager doctrine emphasizes council monopoly over policy while practice underscores the necessity for policy leadership by the manager), but this fact provides merely an advantage

rather than a solution for the mayor manager advocates. The trend in mayor manager cities is not yet clear, but the general manager in a large city seems at this stage no more likely to become a career manager in that city than has the city manager in his.

Some observers profess to see in the mayor manager plan merely a compromise step toward the council manager plan. The reverse would seem to be the more likely development, if any such transference is to occur. The essential ingredient of the mayor manager plan is the appointment and removal of the manager by the mayor as the elected chief executive. The distinctive contrasting feature of the council manager plan—the selection of the chief administrator by the city council—was not only something of an historical accident in the United States; it was also a striking anomaly in a country in which the most distinctive political institution is the elected chief executive as the keystone of political, governmental, and managerial progress. The mayor manager idea has the great and lasting value that it brings the reorganization of our city governments back into a familiar focus, consistent with our efforts in the national and state governments. In this respect it is an indigenous political idea.

The Little Cabinet

. . . the second team of any Administration is as important in its way to the business of government as the first. Here, on the next-to-highest rung of Washington officialdom, a group of men—a "Little Cabinet," it might be called—performs the administrative functions of governing. For it is a Washington truism that when the high brass decides what to do, the low brass gets it done.

Little Cabinets are no novelty to the United States. . . . Under President Eisenhower, however, this sub-Cabinet group has been endowed with semi-official status and incorporated into the chain-of-command system that now prevails at the White House. Its membership is composed of the top deputy from each of the ten departments, plus the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Foreign Operations Administration and the Civil Service Commission (which is represented by its chairman rather than a deputy).

The Little Cabinet meets formally on every other Tuesday in the Cabinet room at the White House. Its agenda is only slightly less formidable than that of the Cabinet itself. But between these sessions the members meet informally among themselves—and that is where most of their work is done. . . .

—Cabell Phillips, "The President's 'Little Cabinet,'" *The New York Times Magazine*, August 8, 1954, p. 6.

Federal-Municipal Relationships and Metropolitan Integration

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METROPOLITAN area government has been the subject of an ever-increasing number of articles and monographs, as well as of privately- and publicly-financed surveys, since the publication in 1930 of the National Municipal League's pioneer study, *The Government of Metropolitan Areas in the United States*, by Paul Studenski. This study and the many which have followed¹ have added to our knowledge of the government of metropolitan areas; they have also sounded repeated warnings concerning the weaknesses and dangers of existing chaotic metropolitan organization and have made urgent calls for metropolitan integration.

Federal-municipal relations, similarly, has been the subject of a growing number of articles and books during the past twenty years, although there are still relatively few volumes on federal-municipal relations in general.²

¹ Such as: Charles E. Merriam, Spencer D. Parratt, and Albert Lepawsky, *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago* (University of Chicago Press, 1933); R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* (McGraw-Hill, 1933); Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee, *Our Cities; Their Role in the National Economy* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937); Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government* (University of Chicago Press, 1942); and Betty Tableman, *Governmental Organization in Metropolitan Areas* (University of Michigan Press, 1951). Special studies of the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, Birmingham, Atlanta, Nashville, Detroit, Washington, D. C., and others have been published in the past two decades.

² Among the more general studies of federal-municipal relations are: Paul V. Betters, J. K. Williams, and Sherwood Reeder, *Recent Federal-City Relations* (Washington, D. C.: The United States Conference of Mayors, 1936); and Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee, *Urban Government* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939), especially Part II, "Federal

These studies describe the multiplication of direct contacts between the national government and cities and point up the constitutional, political, and administrative implications of this development in a federal system. Although the national government had many direct contacts with municipalities even before 1900, federal-municipal relations, like the field of metropolitan area government, did not become an area of serious study by political scientists until about 1930.

When these two fields of study are viewed side by side, it seems rather strange that in spite of the growing literature on each subject, the two are almost never related.³ Virtually all of the metropolitan area studies devote considerable attention to every conceivable alternative solution or device for metropolitan integration, yet omit any consideration of federal intervention in a day when it is customary for frustrated cities to go to the federal government for help in any and all problems. For the most part the literature on metropolitan areas has been limited to detailed descriptions

eral Relations to Urban Governments" by Wylie Kilpatrick and others. Specialized studies on such subjects as grants-in-aid, airport assistance, federal aids to local planning, and cities and national defense are more numerous.

³ The subject is not completely unexplored, however. Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government*, pp. 110-21, gives probably the best consideration of the relation of the national government to metropolitan integration; the reports of the Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee urge separate treatment for metropolitan areas by the national government and federal encouragement of interstate compacts to assist them; and Merriam, Parratt, and Lepawsky consider federal relations to the metropolitan interstate authority as well as to separate statehood for Chicago.

of the structure of their governments and the types of problems which result therefrom and an analysis of the same alternative devices for metropolitan integration classified by Studenski in 1930. After running the gamut of the pros and cons of annexation, contractual agreements, extraterritorial powers, special districts, the federated metropolis, and city-county consolidation or separation, virtually all of the studies conclude with the same pessimistic note—those "solutions" which are adequate are not politically feasible and those which are politically feasible are not adequate.

There is little evidence to indicate that metropolitan integration is any more prevalent now than it was before World War II. In fact, the 1950 census report on metropolitan area population reveals that the suburban satellite cities continue to gain in their struggle to strangulate the central core cities.

Is it possible that the ultimate answer to the problem of providing integrated government for metropolitan areas in the United States lies in the realm of federal-city relations? The 1950 census report revealed that there were twenty-three standard metropolitan areas which extended across at least one state boundary line and twenty-eight metropolitan areas which bordered a state line.⁴ Their combined population was almost 43,000,000 persons. This means that one out of every four persons in the United States lives in a metropolitan area that is now, or is becoming, distinctly interstate in character. It further means that more than one-half of the persons living in standard metropolitan areas live in areas that cross or border a state boundary. There may well be more people living in interstate cities than in intrastate cities of all sizes within the next generation or two. This probability adds new urgency to the search for devices for metropolitan integration and suggests the need for a comprehensive study of federal-city relationships and their existing and conceivable role in influencing the degree of governmental integration of metropolitan areas.

This article undertakes a brief description of the areas of and devices for federal influence

upon the degree of integration of metropolitan area government. They include demonstration; research, surveys, and consultation; statistical reporting; federal spending; contractual agreements; regulation of interstate commerce; promotion of interstate compacts; and exercise of federal war powers.

Demonstration

THE federal government has, in effect, a possible "pilot plant" in the metropolitan area of Washington, D. C. Over 45 per cent of Washington's standard metropolitan area population resides outside the district boundaries in the states of Maryland and Virginia, and the city and its environs manifest all of the common symptoms of metropolitanism. If the federal government could achieve an effective integration of the government of the District of Columbia with its suburbs by some method also available to other metropolitan areas, the result would be new hope for metropolitan integration the country over. This is doubtless what the Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee had in mind when it recommended that "as an experiment, the Federal Government should cooperate with the States of Maryland and Virginia and make use of the unique opportunity to devise a complete scheme of integrated metropolitan government for the District of Columbia and the urbanized outlying areas within this metropolitan district."⁵

No "complete scheme of integrated metropolitan government" has been effected in Washington, and one must look rather carefully even to find instances of limited coordination on an areawide basis of single governmental functions. In the field of planning, for example, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission was established by Congress in 1926 and directed "to develop a comprehensive, consistent, and coordinated plan for the National Capital and its environs in the states of Maryland and Virginia."⁶ It was authorized to spend money for a system of parks and parkways in Maryland and Virginia, as well as in the District of Columbia,⁷ and although it has

⁴ Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee, *Our Cities*, p. 80.

⁵ 44 U. S. Statutes 374 (1925-27).

⁶ Capper-Cramton Act of 1930, 46 U. S. Statutes 482 (1929-31).

⁴ The Census Bureau's definition of standard metropolitan area includes the entire county or counties, in most instances, containing the central city or cities if certain criteria are met.

pushed this program since 1930 and stimulated the creation of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, planning in the Virginia portion of metropolitan Washington is divided among five separate planning commissions.⁸ The National Commission's work in securing agreements between the local governments in the metropolitan area has been criticized for being limited to planning for parks and parkways and for emphasizing primarily financial matters rather than comprehensive planning.⁹ In spite of the necessity for depending primarily upon informal cooperation and influence in securing compliance with its plans, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission has shown no interest in an interstate planning authority created by interstate compact, contending that effective planning can be achieved within the existing framework of separate political jurisdictions.¹⁰

Even less integration has been accomplished in the case of other governmental activities in metropolitan Washington. The National Capital Park and Planning Commission has followed the policy of promoting a series of coordinating committees to deal with such subjects as regional highways, water supply, and sewage disposal. These committees, representing the various separate political units or interest groups, have almost always recommended the preservation of divided responsibility for the various urban services among the separate political units.¹¹

Research, Surveys, and Consultation

MANY federal agencies are engaged in research on problems which are of interest to metropolitan areas and which frequently cut across the field of metropolitan govern-

⁸ A Northern Virginia Regional Planning Commission has recently been established as a result of an enabling act passed by the Virginia Assembly in 1950, but Geddes W. Rutherford, *Administrative Problems in a Metropolitan Area; The National Capital Region* (Public Administration Service, 1952), p. 15, reports that the National Commission continues to deal directly with the five planning commissions.

⁹ Rutherford, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁰ See National Capital Park and Planning Commission, *Regional Aspects of the Comprehensive Plan; A Portion of the Comprehensive Plan for the National Capital and Its Environs* (Monograph No. 6, Washington: The Commission, June, 1950), p. 6.

¹¹ Rutherford, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

mental organization in such a way that integration can be encouraged or discouraged. The U. S. Public Health Service, for example, has been aiding the cause of unified metropolitan health administration for many years by recommending the consolidated city-county health department in its surveys of cities. As early as 1916 the USPHS was successfully promoting functional integration, as illustrated by the creation of a consolidated city-county health department for Jefferson County and Birmingham, Alabama, upon the recommendation of a survey by this federal agency.¹² One of the most recent examples of such influence is the creation in 1952 of a countywide health department for Davidson County and Nashville, Tennessee, on the joint recommendation of the Community Services Commission and consultants from the USPHS and the American Public Health Association.¹³ The USPHS has on occasions recommended the creation of new special districts, however, as in the case of its survey of public health in Chicago and Cook County.¹⁴

Local surveys by the U. S. Office of Education have been generally prointegrationist in favoring the consolidation of the patchwork quilt of small school districts, but the partiality of the office for "taking schools out of politics" by removing the school function from the structure of general government has been decidedly anti-integrationist. Similar federal research and consultative services of metropolitan significance are provided by such agencies as the Bureau of Public Roads, National Park Service, Bureau of Mines, Corps of Engineers, and Civil Aeronautics Authority.

In addition to the permanent research and advisory activities of the various federal agencies, the President often instigates special conferences or study commissions that deal with problems which are partially or wholly metropolitan. In 1950 President Truman appointed a temporary Water Resources Policy Commis-

¹² Weldon Cooper, *Metropolitan County; A Survey of Government in the Birmingham Area* (Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1949), p. 89.

¹³ *A Future for Nashville; A Report of the Community Services Commission* (Nashville, 1952), pp. 151-64.

¹⁴ United States Public Health Service, *The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey* (Columbia University Press, 1949).

sion to study federal legislation and policies in the water resources field. The commission included a "quick reconnaissance of the water supplies of some of the larger cities" and recommended that municipal water supplies should continue to be a local responsibility.¹⁵ It also gave special districts for metropolitan areas a pat on the back by recommending that "the States and the Federal Government should encourage the formation of metropolitan water districts . . . when . . . communities are dependent upon the same source of water supply or when existing water supplies prove inadequate."¹⁶ No mention is made of such alternatives as annexation or extraterritorial powers of the central city as means of providing a unified water supply system without creating an additional layer of government.

From time to time, various federal agencies sponsor special conferences affecting metropolitan government, such as the one on air pollution control called by the Interior Department in 1950 and another on methods of fighting organized crime called by the Attorney General in the same year. It is common practice for such conferences to draft a report on needed federal, state, and local legislation.

Although such devices as conferences, surveys, and consultation have no teeth in them, they could, if properly harnessed, make a valuable contribution to metropolitan integration.

Statistical Reporting of Urban Information

IN THEIR statistical reporting it is customary for such agencies as the Office of Education, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U. S. Public Health Service to classify cities on the basis of each city's incorporated population, regardless of whether it is an enclave in a congested metropolitan area or a quiet agricultural county seat. An inaccurate and misleading picture of such things as crime and health

¹⁵ 32 *Public Management* 62 (March, 1950) and 33 *Ibid.* 57 (March, 1951).

¹⁶ *A Water Policy for the American People, The Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), Vol. I, p. 184. See also Vincent Ostrom, *Water and Politics* (The Haynes Foundation, 1953) for a detailed account of the role of water supply in the development of metropolitan Los Angeles, including the role of the federal government.

is presented when a city which has been able to keep pace with its growth by regular annexations is compared with a city in the same population bracket which has lost most of its middle- and upper-income residents by an exodus to separately incorporated suburbs.

The Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee criticized the inadequate reporting of urban statistical data in considerable detail, both for neglect of urban information generally and for failure to make information "readily usable for studying individual communities as well as the actually urbanized areas and metropolitan districts as a whole."¹⁷ The committee recommended the creation of a division of urban information in the Bureau of the Census as a "central depository and clearing house of all information about urban communities" and also a "central agency for urban research . . . to perform for urban communities functions comparable to those now performed for rural communities by the Bureaus of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural Engineering."¹⁸

The Bureau of the Census began reporting population data for metropolitan districts in 1910, but its publications have dealt with other metropolitan aspects of statistical reporting only to the extent of indicating overlapping debt in cities with over 100,000 population. The 1950 census report introduces a new "standard metropolitan area" concept which uses county boundary lines almost exclusively and thus facilitates comparison of population data with other statistical data reported on a county basis, but data on place of work, which would be invaluable to metropolitan area researchers, are still not included in the census report.

Use of Federal Spending Power

A RESPONSE from local governments which seems impossible to achieve by means of demonstrations, surveys, and the "authority of ideas" may be accomplished with amazing rapidity by use of the federal spending power. A grant of money toward the construction of a much-desired community project will perform miracles toward relaxing the sectional jealous-

¹⁷ *Our Cities, Their Role in the National Economy*, p. 83.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* See also *Urban Government*, pp. 161-77.

ies and rivalries of the units of government within a metropolitan area. Federal grants-in-aid to local governments, growing in volume and variety, have begun in some cases to by-pass the states in favor of direct federal-city contacts. The basic purpose of the grant-in-aid is, of course, the performance of some function on a national scale in cooperation with state and local governments, but a common secondary purpose has come to be the reorganization and improvement of state and local government as it relates to that function. Some of this reorganization and improvement has related directly to metropolitan integration. For example, the requirements of the Social Security Board and the Public Health Service have resulted in the predominant use of the county, rather than the township or municipality, for administering the public assistance, public health, and hospital programs.

The depression public works relief programs in many cases aided the cause of metropolitan integration. Betty Tableman cites the Detroit area water and sewerage network, assisted by the Public Works Administration and other federal funds, as one example, although more integration was achieved in the case of water than for the sewer system.¹⁹ It was assistance from the Works Progress Administration that stimulated joint city-county responsibility for sewage collection and disposal facilities in the Atlanta metropolitan area in 1937. The city of Atlanta and Fulton and DeKalb counties participated in the construction of a sewer system and treatment plant and now, by contractual agreement, support its operation and maintenance. One of the criteria which the PWA adopted in considering whether to approve allotments for each specific project was its metropolitan or regional significance in the light of its relationship to local and regional planning.²⁰ In many cases, however, the emergency public works programs of the depression served to stimulate the creation of special districts.

Federal activities in the fields of low-rent housing, slum clearance, and urban redevelopment have also had mixed effects upon metropolitan integration. While the local housing agency frequently has extraterritorial jurisdic-

tion that includes the entire metropolitan area, it has been set up customarily as a separate authority divorced from the general municipal government. The postwar slum clearance and urban redevelopment program has fallen into the same pattern to such an extent that there is growing criticism of its lack of integration.

The postwar program of federal aid for advance planning of public works, providing for interest-free loans to cities and other local governments, has required that each applicant give evidence that the project would conform to "an over-all state, local, or regional plan approved by competent state, local, or regional authority."²¹ This requirement could conceivably be used to promote metropolitan integration as well as regional planning, but there is little evidence to indicate any active leadership in that direction and some evidence to indicate either ignorance or lack of interest. The provision that any local government unit may apply for funds has sometimes meant, in the case of isolationist satellite cities and suburban special districts, giving "aid and comfort to the enemy" of the central city in metropolitan areas.

The program of federal aid for urban highways and streets could also be used to encourage metropolitan integration. In 1944 Congress for the first time authorized a portion of its highway aid to be spent exclusively in urban areas. Extension of federal highway aid into cities has been accompanied by the requirement that uniform signs and safety devices be placed on the streets involved in such projects.²² This should have the effect eventually of bringing about uniformity on this one point, not only throughout a city, but throughout metropolitan areas. There are many other possibilities, as yet unexploited, in bringing about metropolitan uniformity of street and traffic policies by means of federal aid for urban streets.

The Housing and Home Finance Agency was instructed in the Federal Housing Act of 1949 to encourage metropolitan planning, but the weakness of this approach has been cited in the recent *Urban Redevelopment Study*:

. . . Neither the Housing and Home Finance

¹⁹ Betty Tableman, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

²⁰ National Resources Planning Board, *Federal Aids to Local Planning* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 116.

²¹ Barbara Terrett, "Advance Planning of Public Works," *27 Public Management* 165 (June, 1945).

²² Herbert D. Fritz, "Cities and Federal-Aid Highways," *27 Public Management* 164 (June, 1945).

Agency nor any other single agency should be expected to bring about by itself any appreciable integration of planning and execution of its program, much less of related programs, within metropolitan areas. In fact, if a federal agency succeeds in achieving its program objectives the result may be that functional disintegration of local government will replace territorial disintegration.²³

Contractual Agreements

IN SOME cases the federal government comes in contact with cities by means of contractual agreements, such as electric power distribution contracts between local governments and the Department of the Interior or the Tennessee Valley Authority. The TVA, for example, has entered into contract with the various city-owned electric power utilities, which must agree to a schedule of resale rates, to certain accounting procedures, and to a scheme for disposition of revenues. These contracts frequently have a direct relationship to metropolitan integration, as revealed in the recent survey of urban and suburban Nashville by a city-county study commission. This commission reported in 1952 that the contract between TVA and the Nashville Electric Service "rather sharply limits NES discretion." It has meant that the NES "cannot manipulate its rates or use its profits to assist the City in planning its development, in extending its corporate limits, or in levying special charges on outsiders who use the City without fully contributing to its development."²⁴ The TVA stipulations have doubtless prevented many abuses which might have occurred, but it should not prove to be impossible to work out an arrangement which would include essential precautionary measures while at the same time protecting the interests of the central city in its relationships with the suburban fringe of the metropolitan area.

Victor Jones discusses related metropolitan implications in the contracts allocating Boulder Dam power, pointing out that it would be just as reasonable for the federal government to use the contract as a device to further the in-

²³ Victor Jones, "Local Government Organization in Metropolitan Areas: Its Relation to Urban Redevelopment," in Coleman Woodbury, ed., *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment* (University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 541.

²⁴ *A Future for Nashville*, p. 43.

tegration of metropolitan utility systems as it is to require the City of Los Angeles to transmit power to three suburban municipalities, as it now does.²⁵

Regulation of Interstate Communication and Transportation

GRADING activities of the federal government in the regulation of interstate commerce, especially in the case of communication and transportation, have brought about an increase in direct federal-city contacts, many of which have metropolitan implications through calling for areawide cooperation or consolidation. The Federal Communications Commission authorizes and encourages intermunicipal arrangements for police radio communication in metropolitan areas by regulations providing that no frequency may be assigned exclusively to a single municipality when there is more than one within the zone.

The President's Airport Commission (Doolittle Commission), in its recent report, calls for an effort to secure local government compliance with minimum airport standards by requiring certification by the Civil Aeronautics Authority of airports "necessary for interstate commerce." The Civil Aeronautics Act authorizes the CAA to inspect, classify, and rate airports, as well as to issue certificates for them, but certification is not required and it is not unlawful to operate an airport without a certificate. Many of the recommendations of the commission for airport improvement would be exceedingly difficult to accomplish without basic changes in the existing dispersed and divided governmental situation in metropolitan areas. The Doolittle Commission, while making no mention of metropolitan integration *per se*, does recommend that:

Airports should be made a part of community master plans completely integrated with transportation requirements for passenger, express, freight and postal services. Particular attention should be paid to limited access highways and other transportation facilities to reduce time to the airport from sources of air transport business.²⁶

The commission overlooks some important

²⁵ Jones, *Metropolitan Government*, pp. 119-20.

²⁶ *The Airport and Its Neighbors; The Report of the President's Airport Commission* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 17.

facts of metropolitan life when it recommends that "local zoning authorities" employ their zoning power to control the use of land in two-mile approach zones to airport runways. Frequently the local zoning authority may be a small satellite city which is rapidly enveloping the airport and which has no interest in the airport except perhaps to close it down. This poses a dilemma with the two alternatives very possibly being metropolitan integration or federal centralization. The report of the Doolittle Commission implies that the federal government probably has potential authority under the commerce power to zone areas around airports, and that if state and local governments do not provide adequate zoning the federal government will have to assume responsibility itself.²⁷

The Interstate Commerce Commission has been drawn into the problem of metropolitan area government by virtue of its jurisdiction over street car, bus, and taxicab companies which qualify as interstate transportation because of their operations in a city located in two or more states. The ICC has had to decide important cases involving commutation fares for interurban transit across state lines in the New York City and Washington, D. C., areas. However, the commission has tried to free itself of any responsibility in such cases—and to free the metropolitan transit companies from ICC regulations—by establishing "commercial zones" which are regarded as a part of the mother city. If transportation begins and ends within the zone, no ICC license is required, no certificate of public convenience or necessity is required, and rates or fares are not subject to its regulation. The carriers are subjected to ICC safety regulations and to labor regulations affecting hours of employment.²⁸

The ICC is in a position to do a great deal toward cooperative planning of metropolitan-wide systems of public transportation for such borderline cities, but this remains by and large an unexploited opportunity. One exception to this conclusion, however, is the decision of the ICC prior to World War I in a New York-New Jersey dispute over uniform freight rates in the

entire port district. In upholding the uniform rates, the ICC declared also that the division of the port between two jurisdictions was hindering its coordinated development, thus helping to start a chain of events which resulted in the creation in 1921 of the Port of New York Authority by means of an interstate compact.

Promotion of Interstate Compacts

METROPOLITAN areas that are divided by state boundary lines have special political and administrative problems which receive very little recognition in state and federal policies. The use of navigable rivers as sites for our cities and boundaries for our states has multiplied the number of cities straddling state lines. The Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee had this situation in mind when it recommended in its 1937 report:

The Congress should pass legislation giving advance consent and laying down the conditions under which there may be adopted interstate compacts enabling the several communities within the same metropolitan region, but in separate States, to deal jointly with the regional aspects of health, sanitation, industrial-waste regulation, the control of public utilities planning, public safety and welfare, education, recreation, and other governmental functions of regional scope.²⁹

Actually, the contribution of the federal government to the creation of metropolitan authorities by interstate compact has been limited, in the main, to formal approval of the compacts when presented to Congress. It has encouraged the enactment of uniform criminal laws and interstate crime compacts, but it has never had a positive program of encouraging such compacts as the one creating the Port of New York Authority or the more recent Missouri-Illinois compact establishing the Bi-State Development Agency for the St. Louis-East St. Louis region. With the exception of these two authorities and a few others dealing with such problems as river pollution or bridge construction and operation, there are no other interstate authorities created primarily to achieve metropolitan integration of some function of government.

Most writers on this subject indicate uncertainty as to the feasibility and probability of

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 74.

²⁸ Arnold Haines, "Metropolitan Area Regulation for Borderline Cities," 41 *Public Utilities Fortnightly* 523 (April 22, 1948).

²⁹ *Our Cities*, p. xi.

an interstate authority's developing into a "general" unit of metropolitan government. Albert Lepawsky writes cautiously that "it is not impossible that the large *ad hoc* authority will develop into a compendious unit of metropolitan government incorporating many functions of a consolidated municipality."³⁰ Victor Jones states that it is not likely that "an interstate corporation financed and controlled by states jointly" will ever grow into such a unit for general government, believing rather that the use of the *ad hoc* authority will become more frequent.³¹ Zimmermann and Wendell state in a footnote that "although it is probably in the realm of speculation, a joint municipality might some day be established by compact."³² Whether the metropolitan authority created by interstate compact is conceived of as a device for achieving general governmental integration or only functional integration of the interstate metropolitan community, there are many opportunities for federal leadership in this field.

Exercise of Federal War Powers

UNDER its war powers the national government has engaged in a wide sweep of activities affecting cities, even changing the flow of traffic and the layout of cities by its choice of locations for arsenals, factories, and military posts and, in some cases, building totally new cities. The war powers are exceedingly broad and provide almost unlimited opportunity to bring about either integration or disintegration of local government in metropolitan areas.

Perhaps the best example of the federal government's power of life and death over the goal of metropolitan integration is found in policies relating to civil defense and industrial dispersion. On August 11, 1951, the President issued an Executive order setting forth a federal industrial dispersion policy designed to encourage the placing of new defense and defense-supporting industries in invulnerable or dispersed sites.³³ The policy, recommended by the Na-

³⁰ Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee, *Urban Government*, p. 32.

³¹ Jones, *Metropolitan Government*, p. 98.

³² Frederick L. Zimmermann and Mitchell Wendell, *The Interstate Compact since 1935* (Council of State Governments, 1951), p. 125.

³³ The President's statement and the basic statement of policy by the National Security Resources Board are

tional Security Resources Board, undertakes to overcome the opposition of established metropolitan centers to any draining off of their industrial wealth to other regions by providing that (1) only new and expanding industry must be dispersed, and (2) no region of the country is to be built up at the expense of another—dispersion should take place within each local marketing area by locating new plants perhaps ten to twenty miles out from the concentrated industrial center.

There can be no doubt that the industrial dispersion policy of the federal government, even if only partially carried out, magnifies the problems of local government faced by metropolitan areas. The encouragement of new industries located ten to twenty miles from the concentrated industrial center will mean in many—perhaps most—cases their location a considerable distance outside the central city's corporate boundaries. In describing the benefits of locating new industries at the outskirts of each metropolitan area the chairman of the National Security Resources Board has explained that because the new financing, shipping, labor, and payrolls of the industries would continue to be integrated with the same central city, the economic and industrial integrity of each metropolitan area would be preserved.³⁴ But no mention is made of the *political* integrity of the metropolitan area. What will be the political jurisdiction of the dispersed industries and the resulting satellite cities?

The ten-volume federal report of Project East River concerning metropolitan vulnerability to atomic attack and the steps necessary to reduce this threat makes it clear that federal leadership is the *sine qua non* for whatever results are expected. Is it not possible, without precipitating an academic "hen-or-egg" controversy, to suggest that the two objectives—industrial dispersion and metropolitan integration—could and should be encouraged simultaneously by a carefully planned federal policy of requiring integration of the affected area with

printed, along with a symposium on industrial dispersion, in 7 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September, 1951).

³⁴ Jack Gorrie, "Federal Dispersion Policy Stresses Local Initiative," 7 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 270 (September, 1951).

the central city before approving plant locations?

Conclusions

OUT of this brief survey of federal programs, practices, and influences which relate in some way to those governmental problems peculiar to metropolitan areas a few generalizations emerge:

1. Federal influence upon the degree of metropolitan integration or disintegration has been considerable, but has lacked consistency, coherence, or central purpose. Over-all, the federal government has simply *happened* to encourage (or discourage) metropolitan integration while engaged in carrying out specific functions. There is a growing federal influence for functional consolidation, but there is almost no influence for over-all consolidation or integration of the many units of local government in metropolitan areas. The federal government has shown great concern for such problems as slums, crime, and inadequate civilian defense, but it has shown very little concern for the disintegrated structure of metropolitan government which lies at their roots.

2. Adequate devices are available to the federal government to promote effective metropolitan integration, and most of them are being used (and accepted as "legitimate" methods) to accomplish other objectives in federal-local relationships. There seems to be no radical difference between making the adoption of the merit system a prerequisite to federal welfare aid and making annexation of a suburban "dispersed" defense plant area to the central city a prerequisite for federal approval of the project. The chief difference is simply that the federal government has been sold on the importance of the merit system, while it has not been sold on the importance of metropolitan integration, either to the success of the industrial dispersion program or to the sum total of all federal programs in metropolitan areas.

3. Recognition of the metropolitan area *per se*, whenever at all appropriate, by all agencies of the federal government in the execution of their functional programs would be a logical first step in coordinating the metropolitan as-

pects of city-federal relationships. This would involve, among other things, experimentation with making the larger metropolitan areas, especially those crossing state boundaries, administrative areas for direct relations with the federal agencies. It would involve recognition by the federal government, as manifested by individual agency policies, that metropolitan areas are proper units for federal and state relations and should, therefore, be distinguished from incorporated cities.

Such recognition would not be easy to secure, involving as it does sympathetic direction from Congress and the President, as well as from the individual agencies. It might well be the kind of educational job that a special study commission could perform effectively. Such a study is justified in the name of our civil defense needs if for no other reason. A joint presidential-congressional commission on metropolitan area government that could carry out successfully a twofold task of research and education might point the way toward metropolitan integration.

Many facets of the problem of metropolitan integration remain to be explored. Is functional integration, which is so often recommended by federal agencies, the path to ultimate over-all integration, or does it delay or prevent the over-all solution by lulling the metropolis into a false sense of security? Are such proposals as a separate city-state or provision for metropolitan home rule by amendment to the federal Constitution totally unrealistic and unworthy of serious consideration? And what would be the effects upon the federal system and states' rights of an active program of promotion of metropolitan integration by the national government? These and similar problems must be considered before the feasibility of active federal intervention on behalf of metropolitan integration can be assessed. However, the continued failure to evolve even a reasonable facsimile of integrated metropolitan government for any of the 170 standard metropolitan areas in the United States makes it clear that new avenues to integration need to be explored.

Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Program

By WARREN B. IRONS

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THE multibillion-dollar group life insurance program for federal civilian employees was put into effect August 29, 1954, twelve days from the date President Eisenhower signed the bill authorizing the program. This swift action is a story of short-cut methods and close cooperation between government and private insurance company representatives.

The benefits provided federal civilian employees by this program are, briefly, these. Federal employees are provided with insurance coverage in amounts based upon their annual salaries carried to the nearest upper thousand. If, for example, an employee makes more than \$3,000 a year but not over \$4,000, his insurance coverage is \$4,000. Employees pay \$0.25 per \$1,000 of insurance every biweekly pay period; the government contributes an amount equal to one-half of the employee payment. The law also provides double indemnity payment in case of accidental death and payments to employees for accidental loss of sight or limb.

Other provisions of the program provide that if an insured employee is 65 years old or older, he makes no payment for the insurance. His coverage, however, is reduced by 2 per cent for each month he is over 65 years of age until the amount of coverage he had on his 65th birthday is reduced by 75 per cent. The remaining 25 per cent stays in effect. An employee who is retired on immediate annuity for disability or after at least 15 years of creditable civilian service also receives free life insurance coverage from the date of his retirement, although he is no longer insured against accidental loss of limb or sight or eligible for pay-

ment of double indemnity in case of accidental death.

An employee covered by a group life insurance policy has an opportunity, if he leaves the government, to purchase an individual life insurance policy of the same amount at standard rates from insurance companies participating in the program. He is not required to take a physical examination. The individual policy, however, will not include the double indemnity and dismemberment provisions.

Although some federal employees are not eligible to participate in this program—such as noncitizens stationed overseas and employees who work part time, seasonally, or intermittently—it is still the largest group life insurance program in the world. It amounts to between \$7 and \$8 billion of insurance and covers more than 2,000,000 employees. Despite the fact that the amount of insurance involved equals 10 per cent of the total amount of group life insurance now in force in the United States, the program is being handled with less administrative expense than any other group life insurance program in the nation.

The urgency in putting the program into effect came from a desire to give insurance coverage to as many as possible of the employees whose retirement was imminent and to the families of a certain number of other employees who according to statistical estimates, would soon die. It is estimated that several thousand persons gained this added measure of family protection because the program began operating so quickly. As a matter of fact, approximately 2,000 insured employees retired in the first week after the program was put into effect. About 250 insured employees died dur-

ing the same period. One death, I am told, took place within minutes after the individual was insured.

During the hurried 12-day period, government and private insurance company representatives had two immediate objectives: (1) to complete the major mechanics of operation in order to put the program into effect—details could be cleaned up later—and (2) to get enough information to federal employees so that they would have a sound basis on which to decide whether to take or reject the insurance. The activities to these ends were varied, to say the least.

A 4-page leaflet explaining the basic features of the program to employees was written, printed, and distributed, followed shortly by a question-and-answer document giving employees the answers to questions most frequently asked about the program. Government specialists wrote all necessary regulations governing the operation of the program and prepared necessary forms such as the Designation of Beneficiary and the Waiver of Life Insurance Coverage. Government and insurance company employees drew up a Certificate of Insurance to be given to each insured employee. A series of meetings was held with government executives from all agencies to explain the operation of the program and to work out with budget and fiscal employees the mechanics of handling such financial items as payroll deductions for the employees' share of the cost of the insurance. Finally, the Office of Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance was set up in New York City to administer the program.

While the activities that took place in this short period were rushed, they were thoroughly planned. For example, within the U. S. Civil Service Commission, which is charged with the supervision of the program, each unit involved was given specific assignments with, I might add, the comment: "We realize you can't neglect your regular work *but* we'd like this particular job done right away." And the assignments were completed without the regular work load being neglected, although there was a lot of burning of midnight—and incidentally, unpaid for—oil.

The operations set up under this planned approach were many. The Interagency Ad-

visory Group, composed of personnel directors of government agencies, established a special committee to meet upon call to help in devising solutions to problems of operating the insurance program within government agencies. The General Accounting Office designated a team of accounting specialists to work out the intricacies of any accounting problems that might be giving trouble. The Bureau of the Budget gave the green light to rapid clearance of the standard forms, such as the Designation of Beneficiary. The Treasury Department rushed through special plans for setting up funds for the operation of the program. The Government Printing Office put its day and night shifts to work printing the standard forms and the leaflets explaining the program to employees. And I should note here that the GPO turned out and distributed to government agencies 3,000,000 copies of the leaflet within ten days. And last, but by no means the least important, personnel and payroll employees of all agencies worked hard to prepare their agencies to handle the program when it became effective.

Side by side with these informal operating procedures, numerous shortcuts were used to reduce paper work and thereby speed the date when the program could become operative. Two examples are the employee's election of coverage and his designation of beneficiary.

The positive approach was taken that most employees would want to be included in this program of insurance protection. It was therefore decided that the individual employee would be automatically covered unless he should "elect out." To elect out the employee completes a Waiver of Life Insurance Coverage form, which he obtains from his personnel office. This procedure cut paper work on this one operation by at least 90 per cent.

It was also decided that no employee need designate a beneficiary unless he were dissatisfied with the following order of payment precedence or wanted to designate someone not named in this order of precedence: (1) widow or widower, (2) children, (3) parents, (4) estate, (5) next of kin. This payment precedence is the same as that used successfully for the past five years by the U. S. Civil Service Commission in its administration of the civil service retirement system. This short cut re-

duced paper work for this operation by at least 75 per cent.

But while the major mechanics to operate this program were worked out in a 12-day period, its practicability had been determined long before the law making it possible was passed by Congress. In his message on federal personnel legislation issued early this year, the President explained the need to give federal civilian employees the advantages of group life insurance, thereby bringing the benefits of federal employment more nearly in line with practices in progressive private industry. The job of working out proposed legislation to present to Congress for its consideration was given to members of the informal group of government executives known as the "Little Cabinet." This group is composed of the under secretaries of various government departments and the heads of some independent agencies. It is chaired by Philip Young, chairman of the U. S. Civil Service Commission and the President's adviser on personnel matters. The responsibility for spearheading the efforts to work out appropriate legislative proposals for presentation to the rest of the group, and then to the President's Cabinet, was given to Marion B. Folsom, Under Secretary of the Treasury.

From the receipt of this assignment until proposed legislation was sent to Congress in May of this year, all phases of the program were investigated to determine the cost to the government, what insurance coverage should be given employees, how much employees

should have to pay, who should supervise the program, and the answers to numerous other questions both large and small.

To find the answer to these many problems, information was sought from a variety of sources. Conferences were held with representatives of large industrial concerns which long had had group life insurance in effect for their employees. From these persons came many valuable suggestions on the operation of the program, together with advice on some of the pitfalls to be avoided. Individual insurance companies and insurance associations were also consulted, with the result that a committee of insurance companies was formed to work closely with the government executives charged with developing the proposed legislation to make the program possible. Employee groups were consulted and briefings were held to describe the progress being made. Again, many valuable suggestions were received.

Finally, after much working and reworking, the proposed legislation was forwarded to Congress for its consideration. Congress, in turn, held committee hearings. It then made such changes in the legislative draft as were deemed necessary in the light of comments received in the hearings and the knowledge of individual Congressmen. The legislation was passed by both Houses of the Congress, and the President signed the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 on August 17. Twelve days later the program was in operation.

Local Government Research: A Partial Evaluation

By ALLAN R. RICHARDS

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ANY evaluation of research in state and local government is difficult because publications in these fields are numerous, to say the least. In content, they vary from studies that count manhole covers, through studies that compare water rates, to studies that consider state governments in their entirety. In length, they range from three-page articles in highly specialized periodicals to textbooks of one thousand pages. In form, they range from duplicated pages stapled together by hand to "slick" pages printed in attractive format and bound together with glue, cord, and cloth.

I

AN ATTEMPT to evaluate local government research may be simplified by a preliminary consideration of the methods of collecting and the types of source materials, the purposes of the research, and the scope of the research.

The methods used to gather information and the types of source materials encompass a wide range. RESEARCH falls at one end of the scale and REsearch at the other. RESEARCH makes a contribution to a field of knowledge. It involves collecting data and relating them to existing knowledge within a systematic, conceptual framework. It involves testing an important hypothesis not previously tested. It involves the use of primary source materials, careful documentation, and accurate presentation. The reason students who work with archives are called "searchers" is that they really search. And what they find is customarily not easy to find.

In contrast, REsearch depends largely upon the use of secondary materials. It often purports to solve a problem that has already been

solved.¹ Several years ago, Charles A. Beard described it as "scissors-and-paste" research. The modern generation refers to it as "SS" research, scissors-and-staples research. Unfortunately, REsearch is probably emphasized at the expense of reSEARCH in the desire to provide students with theses, administrative assistants with promotions, and bureaus of public administration with publications. REsearch perpetuates errors and unproved, as well as proved, assumptions.

It is not suggested that all REsearch is without value. There is need to summarize, synthesize, and suggest the application of materials already collected. But there is a greater need for reSEARCH.

The purposes for which research is undertaken vary widely. Service research is at one end of the scale and research for knowledge, understanding, or the satisfaction of curiosity at the other end. Service research strives to improve government or to educate the public. It includes such things as the production of manuals (usually of law) for local government officials, handbooks for freshman legislators, and bulletins in exposition of current and controversial public issues. Such research is usually reportorial and unimaginative. It is action research, intended to accomplish some goal that the author deems valuable. By contrast, research in the quest for knowledge is not intended either immediately or directly to accomplish practical changes, although it may ultimately prove usable, alone or combined with the findings of similar research.

¹ An example is my own *Legislative Services; With Special Emphasis upon the Problems in New Mexico* (Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico, 1953), 29 pp.

One may seriously question whether our present knowledge about local government is sufficient to warrant the large number of service research reports that suggest solutions that purport to be scientific but that probably are intuitive. Preoccupation with service research results in neglect of that fundamental research without which many of the recommendations of service research must be guesswork.

Research in local government is wide in scope—from minutiae to all-embracing studies of municipal government. An inordinate number of studies, however, relate to narrow areas of little basic significance, even to the community studied. An investigation of garbage collection may be important to Mrs. Jones, but it adds little to knowledge of local government. The impossibility of mastering everything in the modern world has led to the development of specialists. In doing research in their fields, specialists in aspects of local government tend to forget that their specialties are but parts of larger phenomena. If they would relate their research to the whole complex setting of a local government problem, the product would be more meaningful and useful.

II.

ANY evaluation must utilize criteria. Several criteria for the evaluation of research reports in local government are suggested below.

The first criterion is that the report inform the reader on how the facts were collected so that he may judge whether he accepts as fact what is stated as fact. If, for example, a municipality reports on an opinion poll to determine public reaction to various types of water-use restrictions, the reader is entitled to detailed information about the sample, the questions, how the interviews were conducted, and the like. He must have this information in order to evaluate the methods of the survey, the accuracy of the data, and the meaningfulness of the conclusions. Failure to provide this information is tantamount to asking the reader to accept revelation as fact. While some persons accept revelation as a source of value, relatively few accept it as a source for facts. Research in local government seldom meets the objective of reporting adequately on its methods.

Second, the research worker should state explicitly the value judgments that underlie his

conclusions. Many conclusions are stated as: "This is effective" or "This is efficient." What is meant by "efficient" or "effective"? These words in themselves constitute conclusions—conclusions as to the users' value judgments. They are meaningless to the reader unless he knows what the author means by them. An expression of the value judgments that lie behind our conclusions is necessary because two individuals evaluating the same factual material may reach widely different conclusions. For example, after study of graft and corruption in a municipal police department, one whose tradition and training have disposed him to dislike partisan party politics may conclude that the remedy for the city's misfortunes is a council-manager plan. After study of the same situation by the same methods, one whose training and tradition have disposed him to regard partisan party politics as the backbone of American democracy may conclude that the remedy for the city's misfortunes is greater popular participation in politics, more intra-party democracy, and greater party responsibility. Research workers are obligated to state their basic political or governmental values along with their conclusions, so that their conclusions may be more meaningful.

A third criterion is that research carefully separate fact from value. This is not a suggestion that the first thirty pages of a study be confined to facts and the last ten pages to values. However, research projects should distinguish between what research workers *think* are facts and what *are* facts.

Many simple-appearing expository sentences conceal value judgments. A typical sentence from a recently published work on county government serves as a good example. The sentence reads, "Many of the newer [county] functions, such as providing airports, libraries, recreation and health services, are primarily of local concern. . . ." This sentence appears innocently factual. It contains no customary evaluative words, such as "good," "efficient," "valuable." It does not contain a "think," a "believe," or an "ought to be." Yet, the sentence does not express a fact, although it contains factual elements. In purpose and in essence, the sentence expresses a value judgment. What it really means is, "I, the author, *think* [believe] that the newer county functions, such

as providing airports, libraries, recreation and health services, *ought to be primarily of local concern.*" In areas of local activity where scientific conclusions are at present not available, educated judgment may provide the best available conclusion. But it ought to be labeled as such.

Accurate writing requires many words because of the necessity of many qualifying modifiers. Unfortunately, this means increased reproduction costs. The introduction of qualifying modifiers may also result in writing that is difficult to read, though it should be possible to convey accurate meaning in a clear, readable style.

A fourth criterion is that research effectively utilize all available data that bear upon a problem. In attempting to discover the facts, some research workers labor under a questionable implicit assumption—that words written on paper, be they statutes, ordinances, judicial decisions, departmental rules, formal letters, or informal memorandums, accurately portray a particular governmental situation.

This assumption is most common today with regard to law. The law, departmental rules, and other pieces of legal paper are read, logically ordered, and summarized in written reports which are labeled research reports. And they are based on research—*legal* research. But it is not research that reveals how a particular municipal department works in practice. Rather, it is research that determines how the rules prescribe that the department *ought* to work. In a sense, this research determines the social goals that have been enacted into law. A study of traffic regulation that is based solely on an analysis of municipal traffic ordinances implicitly assumes that legal norms automatically and effectively change the behavior of people. Fortunately or unfortunately, ordinances do not limit the alternatives of men, whether they be departmental employees or departmental clientele. The rule of law may serve as a useful legal ideal, but it does not serve as the sole basis for modern research upon a modern subject. Laws are enacted by men and they are executed by men. Much research in local government implicitly denies this fact by interpreting legal norms to be the facts rather than the standards of government behavior.

A recent controversy in New Mexico illustrates the point well—the Chavez-Hurley contest for a seat in the United States Senate. The election code provides that the county boards are to furnish precinct officials with one voting booth for each 125 registered voters and that each party shall designate watchers. In many precincts, the county boards did not furnish the booths for the election. In many precincts neither party appointed watchers. Thus, a legal study of the administration of this election in New Mexico might present as fact that each precinct *had* at least one voting booth for each 125 registered voters and that there *were* watchers in each precinct. Such a study would not give an accurate picture of election administration in New Mexico.

The fifth criterion is that research be developed within a systematic, conceptual framework.² Pushing back the frontiers of knowledge about local government depends upon the development of a logical system for the interpretation of government totally considered. A systematic, conceptual framework is necessary if narrow findings are to be related to broader ones, if duplication of research activities is to be avoided, if research is to be encouraged in areas where existing knowledge is slight, and if contemporary conclusions are to be reevaluated at a later date.

If empirical investigation discloses that some facts do not fit within the framework, then the framework must be altered to accommodate the new facts. A systematic, conceptual framework must be developed if the logic of the scientific method is to be applied to facts. By accumulating data that fit within such a framework, hypothetical conclusions about unexplored areas may be reached. These hypotheses can then be tested empirically. If proved, they become part of knowledge. The construction of a framework similar to that of the physical scientists, who "first postulated the existence of latent atomic structures underlying material substances and described in mathematical models which remained unseen until the invention of the electronic microscope made them visible,"³ will be invaluable.

² David Easton, *The Political System; An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), *passim*.

³ F. Stuart Chapin, *Social Science Research; Its Expanding Horizons* (University of Minnesota, 1953), p. 15.

Research must be conducted within a systematic, conceptual framework, for the reason that only related facts are meaningful. Indeed, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a fact unless it is related to some ideological framework. The same phenomenon is many things at the same time and at different times. The same phenomenon is one thing from one point of view and another thing from another point of view. But, whatever there is about any phenomenon that is meaningful depends upon its relationship to other phenomena. Nothing meaningful can be perceived in isolation.

For example, a study of a constitutionally authorized, elected, bipartisan, independent state board of health is meaningless unless it is related to some framework. To the governor, the independence and popular election of the board might mean less patronage, and he might regard it as "ineffective." To the state legislature, the constitutional authorization for the board might remove it from legislative control, and the legislators might also regard it as "ineffective." To the board's clientele, all of its characteristics might make it amenable, and they might regard it as "effective." To the state's civil service commission, the independent board might successfully oppose the merit system and the commission might regard it as "ineffective." The point is that whatever the facts about the board be, they can only be meaningful in relation to some other governmental agency or political value.

III

STUDENTS and practitioners of local government tend to become victims of their traditions, to be dominated by their habit patterns. They become blinded by their own "truths" and their own environs. Perhaps persons engaged in local government research need to engage regularly in professional introspection and "extrospection." Research analysts might profitably spend some of their time testing the validity of currently accepted conclusions and implicit assumptions.

For example, many persons assume that the more local a governmental unit is, the greater degree of "democracy" it provides, the greater the interest of citizens in its policies, and the greater the control of citizens over its policies. This is perhaps why most persons active in

local government defend home rule. Maybe rural areas are better acquainted with county functions and county officials than they are with state functions and state officials. But maybe the reverse is true in urban or metropolitan areas. The generalization might also be valid in certain sections of the United States and not in others, or in some communities and not in others. How does this assumption square with special legislation by the state legislature, where it is the practice to let the district's piper call the local tune? Many of our present-day "conclusions" are empirically testable, and they need badly to be tested.

Another assumption that might bear reevaluation is that a particular form of local government, such as the council-manager plan, is the "best" form of government for most communities. This type of conclusion, reached largely through abstract reasoning, merits scientific, empirical testing—and by a broader measure than that of saving pennies. Laws formally structuring the organization of government and India-inked black lines and boxes on white organization charts do not make all communities alike. The imposition of predetermined, legal forms—however logical or reasonable in the abstract—may do a community more harm than good. Preoccupation with government form, rather than community substance, colors much research and affects its results. Organizational changes may save pennies, but they may also disrupt social structure, threaten the existence of groups, and even affect a community's mental health. Changes in forms of governments may well be evaluated by criteria other than "economy and efficiency." Indeed, from the point of view of the total well-being of a community, a change in governmental form may prove detrimental even in the economic sense.

These examples indicate that some research time might be effectively used in testing some widely held conclusions and assumptions relating to local government.

Within the field of state and local government there is need for more truly comparative studies. Today research is rather disorganized. Each person on his own initiative or under direction chooses a topic for research and a method of approaching that topic. The result is that while completed research on the

same topic for each of the forty-eight states or hundreds of municipalities may be available, anyone who wishes to make a comparison finds that he does not have the materials on which to base it. For it is likely that the studies of the same topic will differ in type of source material, method of approach, and reportorial technique. These differences exist to a certain extent even in some cooperative projects regionally sponsored. The type of case study that effectively contributes to truly comparative investigation needs more than an outline of presentation that follows a regionally determined pattern; it must also use a method that is in detail identical to the method of similar studies conducted by different persons in different places at the same time. Common training of the research workers in the immediate research techniques would be invaluable to such a project. Such studies would permit more accurate comparisons than the educated judgments of various persons who have utilized different methods. Perhaps the organizations at "1313" would be suitable agencies to plan and undertake the direction of such projects on a much broader basis than they have heretofore been planned.

It might be inferred from the preceding paragraph that the use of statistics is being suggested. To an extent, that inference is correct. The avenues of mathematical statistics have not yet begun to be sufficiently explored in local government research, especially in the dimensions of psycho-social space as contrasted to geographical space. In Stuart Chapin's words, "Research in this area [psycho-social space] has already led us to the identification of intermediate structures which connect the facts of observed human behavior with latent factors which in turn may be described by formal models of mathematical statistics."⁴ Such research leads to operational concepts that are useful both as tools of description and as tools of analysis.

While the use of statistical techniques has been suggested, research in state and local government should not depend on them exclusively. Many who use the statistical approach are convinced that it is the only approach and that by its use all situations may be analyzed and all problems solved. This conclusion is of

doubtful validity. The magic of numbers can hardly be a substitute for the value judgments that go into the determination of many conclusions. However, the pure scientist who uses the mathematical or statistical approach is not interested in providing governmental officials with answers to policy questions.

Knowledge, conclusions, and recommendations about local government are more meaningful and realistic when research workers study the *groups*, social and economic, within a community and how they *behave*. In order to change government policy or organization to accomplish a given result, an understanding of the community in which government operates would seem to be necessary. A southwestern state, one is told, is really run by cattlemen. In one city the newcomer is informed that the real estate men really formulate municipal policy and in another that the churches really determine government activity. Are these generalizations true? If so, is it not important to an understanding of local government to know what these groups do, how these groups behave—as opposed to what they say they do?⁵

It is neither meaningful nor realistic for a personnel consultant to come to a community where political party organization is entrenched, bitter, and strong and advocate an all-inclusive merit system based upon the latest "scientific" principles. It is neither meaningful nor realistic for a consultant to study the problem of municipal services to outlying districts and recommend annexation as a solution if a group of realtors who in fact control the city oppose it. A more relative, middle-of-the-road recommendation might temper the ideal and provide some relief; whereas advocacy of the ideal solution might result in complete rejection and no relief. Some professional consultants—be they representatives of private profit-making organizations or public service organizations or bureaus—move into a community for a period of three or more months, purportedly to study a problem as it is, so that they can make effective recommendations for its solution. Yet they might as well never have seen the community, because their recommendations are in ideal terms and fit

⁴ Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government; A Study of Social Pressures* (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1908, 1949), *passim*.

* *Ibid.*, p. 9.

their own preconceived pattern. It is suggested that by the study of group behavior in the community a deeper understanding of its government will be reached and solutions for governmental problems that will be adopted can be recommended.

Studies of the role of different types of men in local government may also contribute to an understanding of local government processes. Thus far, interest in this area has been limited primarily to studies of city bosses. More studies like "Gotham in the Air Age" or "The Battle of Blue Earth County" would provide greater understanding.⁶ In order to make realistic recommendations it would be advantageous to know what personality types perform various kinds of jobs the most efficiently. Only a limited amount of research has been done in this area. From what is known, for example, the best oral interviewers are ruthless and egotistic.⁷

The many available avenues for the understanding, interpretation, and reform of government and political behavior by the use of interdisciplinary techniques and multidimensional approaches are for the most part unexplored.

The tendency to restrict techniques of collecting data to those that are customarily considered to be within the scope of political science has led many research workers to the idea of single-causation. The failure adequately to explore the activities of man and the structure of society in other than the political and the governmental sense has resulted in neglecting to consider possibilities of causation that lie outside the political and governmental areas of study. With the adoption of a multidimensional approach to the study of man in his total environment, it is more possible to develop governmental policies that effectively contribute to the total welfare of man in his community.

Laura Thompson has brought home this point. Utilizing the services of specialists from several disciplines (chiefly social and cultural anthropology, psychiatry, psychology, peda-

gogy, public administration, linguistics, and economics), the Indian Administration Research project, under her direction, covered six selected Indian tribes in twelve representative communities. Ecological, somatic, sociological, psychological, and symbolic variables were studied.

Only by an understanding of all five of these variables was it possible, Thompson found, to discover the sixth variable, the community's core values, i.e., "the community's system of largely implicit, emotionally-hinged beliefs and attitudes regarding the nature of the world, of man, of animals and plants, and the sources and dynamics of power within that system. . . ."⁸ This system of inquiry thus "extends the scientist's frame of reference from the structure of immediately observable human behavior phenomena in a particular society at a particular moment in its history, to encompass the whole man-nature event in space and time whereof the immediately observable phenomena are a part. The integrative, multidiscipline methodology facilitates a structural analysis of the culture in toto."⁹ This system reveals the *covert core* of a culture and emphasizes "dynamically structured, symbolically integrated cultural wholes in environmental settings."

The use of such a system of investigation would provide understanding of government in action, as well as the knowledge necessary for wise determination of government policy and organization. The task would be gigantic and challenging and the results measurable and meaningful.

IV

THESE thoughts about local government research might seem to portray a dismal picture, but consideration of any area of knowledge tends to magnify defects and minimize merits. After all, merit needs no remedy. Research in local government is probably in no worse situation than research in many other

⁶In Harold Stein (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development; A Case Book* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952).

⁷Milton Mandell, "Human Resources in Management," in Allan R. Richards (ed.), *Management Problems* (Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico, 1954).

⁸Laura Thompson, *Personality and Government; Findings and Recommendations of the Indian Administration Research* (Mexico City: Grafica Panamericana, 1951), p. 174.

⁹Laura Thompson, *Culture in Crisis: A Study of the Hopi Indians* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 183.

specialized fields. Most persons who do research in local government are trained in narrow, technical fields, such as engineering or public administration. Narrowness of training and experience has limited imagination and caused neglect of the broad range of phenomena that affect local government.

Deficiencies in local government research result largely from a failure to be concerned sufficiently about relationships—relationships between legal norms and government practice, between forms of government and voter participation, between units of government, between community structure and government policy, between the strength and practices of political parties and government organization, between community growth and changes in governmental policy, and between many other governmental and social phenomena.

Through a broader and more intensive study of relationships, it may be possible to predict more accurately governmental and political behavior and, indeed, to encourage more successfully approved types of behavior.

The predicament of students of local government today cannot be attributed to wholesale lack of interest in these relationships. Rather it may be attributed to a collective misplaced emphasis—a matter of degree rather than of kind. As a disciplinary group, local government research workers operate as individualists, each deciding his own particular research interests and activities. Unfortunately for over-all understanding of local government, insufficient numbers of persons have been studying relationships. It is to be hoped that in the future more research will be directed to studies of this type.

A Loyalty-Security Program

. . . Clearly the national interest requires effective employe security procedures. But basic human values are at stake when an employe is charged with disloyalty. . . . We are uncomfortably aware that existing security procedures . . . are doing serious damage to recruitment and to the effectiveness and morale of the Government service. Action in accordance with the following principles would strengthen the existing security program and reassert basic American traditions of justice and fair play:

(1) It is the responsibility of the Executive Branch to see to it that the loyalty-security program is administered in an orderly, judicious and discerning way. . . .

(2) Although the administration of the loyalty-security program should, in the first instance, be a responsibility of the department heads, an employee discharged on security or loyalty grounds should have a right of appeal to a central board of review. This board of review should also have the duty to examine loyalty-security procedures in the several departments for the purpose of securing fairness and consistency. . . .

(3) . . . We think it more in line with the American presumption of innocence that an employee be continued on the payroll until his case is determined, although suspension from active duty is proper when the charges are serious.

(4) Above all, the loyalty-security program must be taken out of partisan politics. To this end, we urge that a commission of outstanding citizens be appointed by the President to review the entire problem and to seek the development of new standards and new methods of loyalty-security determination.

—From the summary of findings of the Sixth American Assembly, held at Arden House, Harriman Campus, Columbia University, October 7-10. Printed in full in *The New York Times*, October 11, 1954.

Reviews of Books and Documents

The Public Life of "T. R."

By Leonard D. White, The University of Chicago

THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, edited by Elting E. Morison. 8 vols., Harvard University Press, 1951-54.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT made an immense impact upon the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first fifteen years of the twentieth. The dwindling band who can still recall in person his boundless energy, his irrepressible interest in nature as well as in men and events, his famous smile, his high-pitched voice, and his moral fervor will find his match only in the second President bearing his name. The personalities of public figures, even so dynamic a character as Theodore Roosevelt, nevertheless fade rapidly as their time recedes. Even while they live, different estimates are made of their policies and programs; they are praised and condemned with equal fervor and in each case on the basis of very imperfect knowledge.

Contemporaries are necessarily under a handicap in assessing either great men or their place in history. They do not, and cannot, possess the full documentary record, and they lack perspective. It is for this reason that all thoughtful men welcome the tide of publication of letters and papers that has set in since World War II. The new Jefferson collection is well advanced; the Washington papers were completed some years ago; those of Franklin, Calhoun, Madison, and others are in preparation—a consummation due in part to the National Historical Publications Commission established by President Truman. The present collection of the letters of Theodore Roosevelt is a timely and valuable member of this family of publications.

I

THESE eight volumes are organized and indexed in four successive periods: The Years

of Preparation, 1868-1900; The Square Deal, 1901-1905; The Big Stick, 1905-1909; and The Days of Armageddon, 1909-1919. A ninth volume will contain a general index and bibliography. Each pair of volumes is enriched by a series of short essays interpretive of Roosevelt, and by a daily chronology of his whereabouts and activities. From these essays and his editorial work, associate editor John M. Blum has recently published *The Republican Roosevelt*, a volume marked by insight and shrewd evaluation.

The professional scholar always hopes for the complete reproduction of *all* the letters, *all* the memorandums, *all* the interlineations, *all* the drafts of the writings of great men. This objective was attained in the Fitzpatrick edition of Washington's writings, and is being attained in the Boyd edition of Jefferson's papers. It was not sought in the present edition of the Roosevelt letters, which contains about ten thousand of the estimated one hundred thousand that are available. The editor set for his object "to reveal, through the correspondence, the design of a recurring problem, the character of the pressures brought to bear on Roosevelt, and the nature of his responses." He was thus compelled to exercise judgment on the particular letters to include or to exclude.

The criteria of judgment necessarily left much discretion in their application and inevitably are bound to disappoint some specialists in the many fields in which Roosevelt had an interest. Excluded were matters "of incidental concern to the generality of historians"; included were letters bearing on topics that "historians would like to find and could most usefully find in these volumes." Thus natural history was subordinated to politics. The specialist in governmental administration cannot complain that his field was neglected, although the problem of indexing handicapped full ref-

erence to the many letters that bear directly or indirectly on this subject.

Pending accomplishment of the truly monumental task of publishing all the Roosevelt papers, we can be grateful for those now made available, without lamenting the ones that remain in the archives. This edition is an immensely valuable asset to students of history and to students and practitioners of the art of administration. The editors and their staff are entitled to the gratitude of all who are interested in public affairs.

II

THE long public life of "T.R." (a title for which "F.D.R." was never a full equivalent) opens up almost endless aspects of politics, diplomacy, military affairs, finance, and administration. The readers of this *Review* will be interested in his operations in administration as police commissioner in New York City, as a member of the United States Civil Service Commission, as Governor of New York, and as President of the United States. The limitations of space and the private inclination of the reviewer join to concentrate attention upon Roosevelt's six years of service on the Civil Service Commission, from 1889 to 1895, and upon some aspects of his years as President. As commissioner he revealed all the qualities of energy, impatience, determination, courage, political maneuvering, and moral idealism that were to become better known while he was in the White House.

Roosevelt did not wish to be a member of the Civil Service Commission. His friends (doubtless with some prompting) tried to persuade President Benjamin Harrison to make him Assistant Secretary of State. Failing in this enterprise, Roosevelt accepted a place on the commission, convinced that the appointment ended forever any chance of a political future, and began his new duties in May, 1889. Six years later almost to a day he resigned to return to New York politics, having served through Harrison's administration and two years of the second term of Grover Cleveland.

Roosevelt was to the Civil Service Commission (then only six years old) what General Dawes was to be in 1921-22 to the Bureau of the Budget. The new commission was not only an infant, but an unwelcome one. Cabinet mem-

bers were generally unfriendly; Presidents were lukewarm on crucial occasions (after an interview with Harrison, Roosevelt wrote Henry Cabot Lodge, "Heavens, how I like positive men"); many members of Congress and many well-placed executive officers were openly hostile. The new commissioner characterized one of the Assistant Secretaries in these words: "he hunts through the departments for patronage places as a pig hunts truffles. . ." Of a high postal official he wrote, "It is another of the innumerable instances in which he has descended to mean, sneaking little acts of petty spoils mongering."

The situation was one to which Roosevelt was ideally suited. He and his colleagues went to work to enforce and extend the Civil Service Act, not only to better the public service but primarily "to raise the tone of public life." Moral fervor, physical energy, and a complete willingness to fight a good battle all went to work for the merit system. He seized the initiative where he could and fought defensively where he had to. Testifying before the House Select Committee on Reform in the Civil Service on January 29, 1891, he said:

. . . let me explain that I never made any attack on any Department; but if any Department, from that of the Postmaster General to that of Mr. Porter [the Census Bureau] makes an attack upon me or upon the Commission I represent I will pursue the course I have always pursued, and will answer it in public, if it is made in public. I should hold myself derelict in my duty to the Commission of which I am a member if I did not make public answer to a public attack upon the Commission.¹

On June 2, 1889 (after one month in office), he wrote his sister that he did not intend to have the commission remain a mere board of head clerks. At the end of the month he wrote Lodge,

. . . I have made this Commission a living force, and in consequence the outcry among the spoilsmen has become furious; it has evidently frightened both the President and Halford [Harrison's private secretary] a little. They have shown symptoms of telling me that the law should be rigidly enforced where people will stand it, and gingerly handled elsewhere. But I answered militantly; that as long as I was responsible the law should be enforced up to

¹ H. Rep. No. 4038, 51st Cong., 2d sess. (March 2, 1891), p. 150.

the handle *every where*; fearlessly and honestly. (vol. I, p. 167)

Apart from this militant intention of enforcing the law upon all and sundry, what were Roosevelt's ideas about the public service? Without a full presentation, we note a number.

1. On the general role of the commission he wrote (while President) that he wished it managed with a common sense desire to have the civil service system work well in the departments; that he wished the commission to be considered the friend, not the enemy, of the departments; and that he wanted to remove all questions of political or religious favoritism from the civil service. On the composition of the commission he declared in 1890 that he favored in principle one commissioner, but doubted the wisdom of change until the tradition of nonpartisan administration became well established.

2. On appointments, he was always ready to listen to Republican members of Congress, but he declared (while President) that where a senator thought he had a *right* to nominate whomsoever he chose, the custom of consultation was necessarily discontinued. On political activity within the competitive service, he drafted the civil service rule barring "any active part in political management or in political campaigns, for precisely the same reason that a judge, an army officer, a regular soldier, or a policeman is debarred."

3. On veterans' preference he desired "a substantial preference whenever in point of fitness to perform the duties of the place sought they stand reasonably near an equality with other competitors," but not to the detriment of the public service.

4. He resented the presence in Washington of employee representatives lobbying in Congress, and issued the so-called "gag-rule" to put a stop to it. This rule was terminated by Congress under the leadership of the elder Senator La Follette.

5. Faced, as President, with a potential strike in the Government Printing Office he declared that after one warning to resume work he would not permit reinstatement of any man who continued on strike.

6. Comparing the British and American public services in 1895 he had to report that

"the civil service is not looked to as a career by anyone" and to declare that until the higher places in the service were held open to merit and a check put on unjust removals, this would continue to be the case.

Commissioner Roosevelt touched upon one problem which has vexed Presidents, task forces, and professional students of public administration ever since his day, i.e., the nature of the central personnel agency. In 1890 he favored a single commissioner—as soon as circumstances were ripe—but he proposed no change while he was in the White House. President Hoover proposed a single commissioner during his term of office, but the issue was not pressed. The President's Committee on Administrative Management made the first reasoned argument for a single commissioner in 1937, and missed success by only a narrow margin. The first Hoover Commission moved in this direction, and President Truman concentrated administrative responsibility in the chairman of the Civil Service Commission. What will be said by the second Hoover Commission on this point remains to be disclosed. It can be argued more convincingly today than in 1937 that the circumstances are ripe for the consummation of a long, slow trend.

Speaking of the appointment of civil service commissioners, Roosevelt remarked in 1890, "It is not easy to get the proper kind of a man to take the place, though there are plenty of applicants." A number of Presidents might have concurred in this view. What, indeed, is the proper kind of a man? The post of chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission is not an enviable one. It holds no political prospects; indeed it is usually the kiss of death on political ambitions. Hence able men with political ambitions fight shy of this appointment. Yet the job requires political sensitivity and wisdom of a high order, and where shall these qualities be found except among the political practitioners?

The chairman needs to be a person of skill and tact in dealing with Congress. Senate and House committees are the arbiters of policy and finance, and a commissioner may be of as great value on "the Hill" as in his own office or among his executive colleagues. Without confidence and respect on "the Hill" no Civil Service Commission can prosper.

The chairmanship requires administrative ability of a high order; the operation of the commission is complex, nationwide if not worldwide in its coverage, touching almost every federal agency at one of its two most delicate points: manpower and finance. The position has power, but progress is made by masking power—by a judicious mixture of persuasion and compulsion. The administrative role suggests experience in business administration as a useful qualification, but no high-power business executive has yet been appointed to this office.

The chairman needs knowledge of the law and practice, the theory and history of the public service, and an intimate understanding of the special circumstances that properly apply to almost every agency. How can he know these things unless he has grown up in the service; and if he must depend on others who have, does he not become their prisoner? A commissioner needs also a sense of direction, an appreciation of the distant goals yet to be achieved but achievable by virtue of insight, determination, and skill in molding events to these larger ends.

Commissioners, moreover, must be prepared to endure unpopularity. By definition they cannot be popular with patronage brokers or office seekers. By virtue of their inescapable duties of maintaining standards and policing the personnel system, they are in frequent conflict with the operating agencies. They are condemned for failing to understand the necessities of the political party, and for yielding too easily to partisan pressure. They are criticized by the departments for inflexibility and by congressmen for failure to police them more diligently—where the personal interests of congressmen are not involved. The bolder the commissioner, the more certain he is to be hated by one wing or the other of the contestants over the nature of the public service. Roosevelt was well hated.

What did Roosevelt accomplish during his six years as a member of the United States Civil Service Commission? He himself claimed little beyond fighting to defend and support the merit system. Beyond doubt he made the commission a force in the governmental system, and in its first decade this was an achievement of primary importance. He struck terror into

the hearts of contumacious postmasters and collectors of customs by making personal investigations and roundly castigating offenders. He warded off some assaults on the merit system, but not infrequently complained of his lack of success. He was not an innovator; indeed his time called not for innovation but for consolidation. He left the commission stronger in every respect than he found it.

III

ROOSEVELT was a professional politician and he is remembered for his political program and activities rather than for his administrative achievements in the White House. He set out to "bust the trusts," he wielded "the big stick," he "took Panama," he sent the Navy around the world, he had an important part in concluding the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time he was an able and vigorous executive, standing head and shoulders above his predecessors since the days of James K. Polk.

In an essay at the close of volume six of this series, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., summarizes Roosevelt's talents as an administrator. They were primarily capacity to make decisions rapidly, to choose able men for important administrative posts and to give them both authority and support, and to centralize authority and responsibility.

A necessarily brief summary of three administrative operations may suffice to illustrate Roosevelt's grasp of administrative management: the establishment of the General Staff, reform of the organization to build the Panama Canal, and appointment of the first executive body to make recommendations on the reorganization of the federal administrative system, the Keep Committee. There were many other achievements, such as the improvement of the consular service, the establishment of civil government in the Philippines under William Howard Taft, the reorganization of the Forest Service, the establishment of the Department of Commerce and Labor, the creation of the meat inspection service, and the great expansion and marked improvement of the efficiency of the Navy.

Top organization of the United States Army in 1900 was almost precisely what John C. Calhoun had made it by 1818. Adequate in his time, it was thoroughly insufficient when Elihu

Root became Secretary of War under McKinley and continued with Roosevelt. The old General Staff (a collective name for the Army supply and auxiliary services) and the Office of Commanding General were abolished, a new General Staff in the contemporary sense of the term was established by law, and the quasi-sovereign Army bureaus were brought into some degree of coordination and subordination. Roosevelt left the initiative to Root, but, as he would have said, "backed him to the hilt."

In authorizing the construction of the Panama Canal, Congress established the Isthmian Canal Commission of seven members to do the job. Roosevelt informed Congress that a seven-headed commission was a clumsy executive instrument, and asked for a single commissioner. Congress refused. Roosevelt then appointed General George W. Goethals chairman of the commission, chief engineer, and Governor of the Panama Canal Zone. Friction still persisted despite this concentration of responsibility. Finally Roosevelt issued an Executive order (January 6, 1908) giving Goethals essentially absolute authority over the commission. At the same time he notified other members of the commission that Goethals' recommendations would be acted on exactly as if he were the sole commissioner, that he had the entire responsibility, and that any commissioner who did not accept this understanding would be promptly replaced.

Roosevelt's letter of instructions to Charles Hallam Keep, June 2, 1905, printed for the first time in this collection (volume IV, p. 1201), was a model for all reorganization commissions, the more remarkable because this was the first systematic effort by the executive branch to improve administrative management. Keep and his associates were directed to find out what changes were needed "to place the conduct of the executive business of the Government . . . on the most economical and effective basis in the light of the best modern business practice." Among particular matters the President stated his belief that salaries should be commensurate with market value and uniform across departments (an objective

set in motion by the Classification Act of 1923); that government supplies should be standardized and purchased centrally (a program finally worked out in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949); that the duty of the accounting officers was to facilitate executive work and that fiscal restrictions should not interfere with executive discretion (an end proposed again by the President's Committee on Administrative Management and gradually being achieved since the close of World War II); that an official gazette should be published to contain all executive orders and departmental regulations (an achievement finally brought to pass by the Federal Register Act of 1935); and that a resolute effort should be made to secure brevity in correspondence and the elimination of useless letter writing. This enumeration suggests the President's insight into matters administrative, and also how far ahead of his time he was.

IV

THE virtues of collections of letters and papers of great men are many. They permit us to watch the growth of character from youth to full maturity; they reveal what was not designed to be known; they proclaim aspirations and disappointments as well as successes; they tell us what great men thought of each other, which from the days of Hamilton and Jefferson is usually very little; they lay bare the principles on which they acted. The harsh compulsions of Jefferson's embargo can only be understood by reading what he wrote privately but did not declare publicly: that he was engaged in a great experiment to determine whether economic pressure could replace war as a means of international settlements. The administrative history of the United States is told in part from the public documents, but it can be understood only by the revelations of purpose and character that appear in the private letters of the participants. For this and other reasons we hail a welcome addition to the sources of understanding of Theodore Roosevelt and his contribution to the administrative process.

The Office of the Chief Executive

By Don K. Price, The Ford Foundation

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT, by Sidney Hyman.
Harper and Brothers, 1954. Pp. 342. \$4.00.

THE ghost writer, like the classical civil servant, is supposed to cultivate a passion for anonymity. But just as the civil servant sometimes takes to politics (often with unhappy results), the ghost writer sometimes abandons his cover. So now comes Sidney Hyman, who has helped write speeches for a considerable number of leading politicians, and collaborated with Marriner Eccles on his autobiography and with Robert Sherwood on *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, and turns out a book under his own by-line.

The American President is an ambitious and extended essay on the nature of the U. S. Presidency, as the key institution in our constitutional and political system. If Mr. Hyman had ever finished his doctorate in political science, he might have acquired too many scholarly inhibitions ever to tackle so broad a subject with so dashing an approach. But perhaps because he was the kind who would rather help elect a Phil LaFollette or a Paul Douglas than finish a dissertation, he has tried to write for the layman a book that sweeps over the whole range of American history, and that sums up the significance of the office of our Chief Executive. The specialist, of course, will find the book superficial for his purposes, and many a layman will find it opinionated, but it asks and tries to answer some of the most profound questions about the nature of our governmental system. And surprisingly enough for a young politician with a considerable disdain for administration ("it would be far better to have bad administration and good policy than it would be to have good administration and bad policy," p. 331), he has dealt shrewdly with those aspects of the American political system that have most deeply influenced the nature of its administrative organization.

A quarter-century ago there was a great to-do among scholars over the issue whether "administration" was a function of the chief executive or of the legislature. A good many research scholars concentrated their attention on the legislature, first from the legal point of

view, since all administration depended on legislative action, and later from a sociological point of view, since political conflicts offered so interesting a laboratory of social relations. Meanwhile, most official studies concentrated on the responsibility of the executive as a practical approach toward reform—the Brownlow Committee, the Hoover Commission, and their counterparts in the states and cities. But few studies have pointed out the way in which, in the American constitutional tradition, partisan and legislative politics make it necessary to have a strong and independent executive, with command over the tools of administration, in order to develop a responsible form of government.

Most of Mr. Hyman's book deals with the political and constitutional phases of the Presidency, and in the broadest historical terms. He discusses the powers of the Presidency and their dependence on the unwritten as well as the written Constitution; and he describes the selection of the President, and the way in which it is controlled not only by the parties whose growth the Constitution tried to prevent, but by a number of traditional rules of eligibility which develop out of the political balance among the sections and the factions that dominate American politics.

But even as he writes on what seem to be purely political subjects, their significance for administration begins to appear. The President, unlike most other chiefs of state or chief ministers, both reigns and rules. Since he must rule, he cannot leave to others the responsibility for administration. If he will not see to it that the machinery of government works effectively—not of course by direct personal management, which is impossible even in much smaller organizations than the U. S. government, but by effective political support for the career official and the managerial systems that integrate and invigorate policy—no one else will. And since he must "reign," for no one else can symbolize to the American people the organized purposes of their nation, he cannot operate as a mere party leader, but in some measure, even while serving as the active chief

of his party, he must seek to serve the people as a whole, and to appeal for their united support.

It is this status of the President, and the undisciplined character of the Congress, that require the President to use his Cabinet for political purposes, and to make other provision both for his intimate political advice and for his administrative staff work. Hence, throughout most of our history, the Kitchen Cabinet; hence, in recent years, the Executive Office of the President.

Mr. Hyman is at his best in discussing the effect of the Presidency on the party and electoral system. Since a republic like the U. S. can have no chief of state who stands above parties and commands the automatic loyalty of a whole people, the political Executive must take care not to let his party take a stand on crucial issues that will be so uncompromising as to threaten the unity of the nation. This general point of view makes Mr. Hyman, who is an aggressive liberal in politics, a stanch conservative in constitutional issues. He is against the development of two parties with clear-cut theoretical differences; he is against changes in the electoral system which would make for mathematical neatness and remove the anachronistic electoral college, but at the expense of making it more difficult to organize majority support for a truly national candidate; and he is against a national primary, which would lose the advantage of the convention where, with all its disorder, the various leaders and factions can maneuver and negotiate until a genuine consensus is attained.

But Mr. Hyman's sense of the influence of constitutional form on the organic development of political institutions shows most clearly in the final third of his book, which deals with "The Office" of the President. Here he begins by discussing the President as "Manager of Social Justice and Prosperity." In this chapter he discusses the anomaly of requiring the President (under the Employment Act of 1946) to make plans for the prosperity of the nation, while many of the key functions of the executive branch dealing with economic policy are entrusted to independent commissions. Mr. Hyman endorses the Hoover Commission recommendations regarding the independent commissions as desirable but all too timid ac-

tions, and argues that if any discretionary power is unavoidable it ought to be "lodged in the officer of the highest rank who is directly answerable to the Courts in his legal character, and to the Congress and the people in his political capacity." (p. 266) Nevertheless, he basically distrusts the granting of too much influence to the President in economic matters—particularly in finance and credit. ". . . the reduction of the President's role in the economy, and the re-establishment of a fairly clear line between the political and economic order, depend on one thing . . . the performance of the free competitive system as it governs itself by its own reflexes." (p. 271) And when this cannot be accomplished, Mr. Hyman suggests that the grant of extraordinary powers to the President be subject to repeal by concurrent resolution of the Congress (a form of action which the President cannot veto).

In his final chapter on "Reorganization of the Executive" Mr. Hyman takes up in turn all the familiar nostrums that have been prescribed for the reform of the Presidency and the top levels of the executive branch, and dismisses each in turn. Arguing both from early history and from the logic of the presidential system, he debunks the proposals for the operating Vice President, the responsible Cabinet, the Cabinet secretariat as a chief coordinator, the participation of Cabinet members in congressional debate, the council of senior advisers, and the joint executive-legislative council. These ideas were, he argues, all rejected by the Constitutional Convention for good and sufficient reasons; moreover, "they would change the presidency into a Cabinet form of government without changing the Congress into an English parliament." Thus, he concludes, they "would produce a sharp, if not fatal, cleavage between power and responsibility." (p. 314)

Mr. Hyman is a little less convincing in his positive than in his negative recommendations—but then it is always hard, and not logically necessary, to answer the critic's question "Well, then, what would you do about it?" He recommends that the Congress have a budget bureau of its own—perhaps by a reconversion of the General Accounting Office—without considering how any such agency would be controlled and held accountable for its policies by any

responsible congressional organization or procedures. I am no more convinced, for that matter, of the general wisdom of his idea that the concurrent resolution be used as a means of holding the President accountable to the Congress—to say nothing of the doubtful constitutionality of the device.

It is tempting to be captious in criticism of this book, simply because its scope is so wide that it could not hope to be consistently good in its insight into all the aspects of the problem. It leans rather heavily on the historical allusion and anecdote and on broad political generalization, and its arguments would stand up better (for the critical bureaucrat or the student of administration) if buttressed by more practical detail. Thus, in the chapter on the President as "Manager of War and Peace" Mr. Hyman tells a good bit about the ideas and the problems of the eighteenth century fathers, but discusses only in the most sketchy terms the current problems of industrial mobilization and strategic planning, and the tremendous difficulties of making those processes professionally efficient and at the same time of keeping them under democratically responsible control. Similarly, he talks of the shortcomings of the Cabinet, but says little about the efforts that have been devoted to improving the work-

ings of the gradually developing system of interdepartmental committees, from the National Security Council on down. And the story of the Presidency is not complete without at least a word about the similar problems of the chief executives at other levels of American government—the governors and mayors and city managers—whose development has deeply influenced that of the Presidency itself.

But it would not be fair to this book to hold these up as shortcomings, for it was not written primarily for a professional audience. It accomplishes its main purpose of dealing with the broad questions about the political and constitutional nature of the Presidency—a scope which lets the author hit only the high spots of administration. Indeed, he has paved the way for some student of management to write a much more thorough and detailed study of the effect on American administration of our political traditions and our characteristic system of checks and balances. And those of us who would like to read such a book may well hope that its author may combine with his interest in administrative detail something of Mr. Hyman's sense of history, breadth of imagination, and appreciation of the effect of practical politics on the patterns of organization.

Cabinet, Ministers, and Civil Service

By J. W. Grove, University of Manchester, England

GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT: A SURVEY FROM THE INSIDE, by Herbert Morrison, Geoffrey Cumberlege. Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. 363. \$3.40.

THE QUEEN'S GOVERNMENT, by Sir Ivor Jennings. Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 153. 2s. net.

I

THE British Constitution is never lacking in expert commentators, but it is not often that an elder statesman writes at length about the system while still, so to speak, on active service on the party front bench. Mr. Morrison has done this, and has produced a serious account intended, as he says in his preface, "to be useful to the good and thoughtful citizen,

students, and practitioners of public affairs, teachers, and perhaps even professors of Political Science."

No one is better qualified to do this than Mr. Morrison, for he has been a member of the British House of Commons for thirty years, and has held high office in four administrations, as Minister of Transport, Minister of Home Security and Home Secretary (a combined wartime post), Lord President of the Council, and Foreign Secretary. He has been concerned with scientific research, economic planning, the development of the nationalized industries, and a multitude of other subjects of great importance since the war, when, as Mr. Attlee's Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of

the House of Commons, he played a leading part in Britain's "cautious revolution."

The Queen's Government, a judicious blend of history, constitutional law, and political analysis, proves once again that no one can write a short book about the British Constitution better than Sir Ivor Jennings. He covers rather more ground than Morrison, but otherwise the two books are remarkably complementary without being repetitive. Jennings is, of course, more scholarly than Morrison, who is always forgetting that he is supposed to be "academic." From time to time he slips in the telling Cockney phrase. His Ministers "get shot at" in Parliament, which naturally "lands them in the soup" (in trouble). Debates get charged "with party fireworks" and end "in a first-class row."

The subtitle of Mr. Morrison's book is "A Survey from the Inside," but one should not conclude from this that it is the inside story. There is no party politics, and although here and there the book contains information that only a person in Mr. Morrison's position could give, he is the soul of discretion. He is the dramatic critic commenting on the action on the stage and the quality of production, rather than the stage manager describing what happens when the scenery gets stuck. The trouble is, of course, that unlike his American counterparts, who serve their brief time as political heads of departments and then depart, usually forever, to their law practices and banking businesses, Mr. Morrison has the reasonable expectation of a good many more years, as he would say, "on the job." This prevents him from saying as much as he might otherwise say. He also owes a loyalty to his party—a much more monolithic affair than either of the American parties—and, technically, as a Privy Councillor to Her Majesty the Queen (a position which he holds until he dies) his lips are sealed.

There is thus much less difference between the two accounts than might have been imagined. Sir Ivor Jennings writes with his resources—letters, reports, biographies, and so on. Mr. Morrison writes with his—a very long time in the business, a shrewd and observant eye, and an occasional use of the research facilities of Nuffield College, Oxford.

II

If present-day statesmen had a motto, it ought to be: "It's Tough at the Top." They all have far too much to do, and the machinery of government is forever tending to get clogged. When Mr. Morrison asked President Roosevelt whether he would be standing for a second term, the President replied: "Morrison, being President of the United States is a terrible job. . . . It is a hard—a very hard—life. Who would want a second term?" (p. 90) Being a British Cabinet Minister is hard, too. At the Foreign Office Mr. Morrison got five hours sleep a night. "I slept at 11 Downing Street, and in the summer months the glory of the dawn would have appeared over St. James's Park by the time I got to bed. The birds were fresh and lively, full of song. More than once I said to myself, 'Ah, little birds, you went to bed early last evening. . . . I almost wish I were a little bird.'" During the last war, ". . . Mr. Churchill's little custom of calling late ministerial meetings, involved a bedtime of about 3 or 4 a.m. and sometimes later, and up at 8 a.m." (p. 63)

Mr. Morrison does not doubt that the tremendous strain of the Foreign Office killed his predecessor, Ernest Bevin, just as surely as the American Presidency killed Roosevelt. But overwork is not confined to Ministers. It reflects itself in the higher levels of the civil service. "Overwork," says Jennings, "is endemic in the senior ranks of the civil services and is an inevitable part of the system." Morrison considers it perhaps more dangerous for civil servants to be overworked than it is for Ministers, since they have to do the detailed planning and thinking and drafting.

This problem of "apoplexy at the centre" has gravely concerned official commissions from Haldane to Hoover. But it is difficult to know what to do about it. So long as Western democracy remains responsible democracy, the demand will be made for clear sources of power and authority where responsibility can be fixed. This demand inevitably tends toward centralism. In the British system of government, final responsibility is centered in the Cabinet.

The Cabinet is a curious kind of committee. Constitutionally, it differs from most committees. In the average committee opinions differ,

but when a vote is taken the losers do not automatically resign. In the Cabinet, the members are all supposed to be "in the same story." There is no voting, but, as Mr. Morrison tells us, there are occasions when "the voices must be collected." All the members are then expected to abide by the decisions of the Cabinet or resign. This "collective responsibility" developed, as Jennings explains, as a protection for Ministers against the King. This was in the eighteenth century. Nowadays, collective responsibility is a device for maintaining the strength and unity of the party. If Mr. Aneurin Bevan disagrees with his colleagues about the financial basis of the National Health Service he resigns. For the policy is the policy of the Cabinet (the party leaders), not of the Cabinet minus one.

But collective responsibility only operates in the final analysis. The Cabinet is also a committee of heads of departments. It is thus an odd sort of tribunal, on which all the interested parties are represented, with the Prime Minister holding the balance. To it comes all important questions which cannot be settled between Ministers or "at the official level," i.e. between senior civil servants. Where the Cabinet is acutely divided "the quality of the Prime Minister, and indeed others, is tested. Careful judgment is needed to know whether the decision shall operate or whether the strength of feeling is such that not only would Cabinet unity be imperilled but also the success of the policy itself might be endangered." (Morrison, p. 6)

The Cabinet is also a secret committee. There are good reasons for this. One is that the public interest is better served if Ministers can engage in full and frank discussion. As Morrison says (p. 19): ". . . Ministers have one duty above all others: it is to speak the truth as they see it and pursue the public interest as they see it without fear." They will be less likely to speak their minds if secrecy is not observed, and publicity notoriously invites speaking "for the record." A second reason is that it helps to maintain the doctrine of collective responsibility. Is the doctrine worth maintaining? It is, for it concentrates responsibility and makes it clearly visible. For the doctrine is not confined to the Cabinet. "It permeates the whole administration" (Jennings, p. 122), in-

cluding the civil service, thus allowing work to be delegated (as in modern times it must be delegated) far down the line, without responsibility becoming diffused. The mistakes of the civil servant are the mistakes of his Minister, and if they are important enough, of the Government as a whole.

The principle enables the departments to limit the number of problems put to the Cabinet, and thus helps to relieve pressure at the top. But this pressure is still very great. A number of devices have been tried, and others suggested, to help lessen this pressure even more: Cabinet committees, nondepartmental ministers, and overlords among them. The number of Cabinet committees is now very large. Mr. Morrison lists seventeen standing committees in Mr. Attlee's postwar government, with a number of other special and *ad hoc* committees. The work, and at any given moment the existence, of these committees must also remain secret, for they are subunits of the Cabinet. Apart from relieving pressure on the main body, they have other advantages. First, they include a great many of the Ministers who are nowadays left out of the Cabinet proper for reasons of size. Second, they are indispensable instruments of policy coordination. They may not, however, relieve senior ministers of much work for they are usually represented on a number of committees, sometimes as chairman. Mr. Ernest Bevin, for example, though Foreign Secretary, was chairman of Mr. Attlee's Cabinet Committee on Manpower, because of his unique experience in this field.

Moreover, they do not necessarily lighten the work of the Cabinet (though of course they tend to) for "in some cases . . . the conclusions reached in a committee may still have to be confirmed by the Cabinet and in any case if any body of opinion in the Committee is not satisfied with the conclusion reached it may take it to the Cabinet." (Morrison, p. 25) This does not happen often, "otherwise the Committee system would be rather a waste of time." The Minister without departmental responsibilities can often do most valuable work as chairman of Cabinet committees. And, in other ways, he clearly plays an important part at the present time. If he is in the Cabinet he can give his mind to questions of long-term policy which his more harassed departmental

colleague has not the time to do. Mr. Morrison does not, however, like Mr. Amery's ideas about small policy-forming cabinets composed entirely of Ministers without departmental responsibilities. He thinks that this implies an unrealistic divorce between policy and administration. The Morrison pill for good government is a Cabinet composed of some departmental Ministers, together with three or four nondepartmental Ministers with time to think, coordinate, and do other tasks of an inter or nondepartmental nature, such as the development of scientific research.

He does not like the experiment Mr. Churchill (as he then was) made with overlords—the supercoordinating Ministers. But the real objection appears to have been less that they were coordinators than that they were Peers, and therefore unanswerable to the House of Commons. They have now been discreetly dropped. Nobody liked them, and no one has really understood what they were supposed to do. Nowhere was their ambiguous position made clearer (if that is the word) than by Lord Stansgate in the House of Lords. What the Secretary of State for the Co-ordination of Transport, Fuel and Power was responsible for, said Lord Stansgate, was the coordination of transport, fuel, and power. This did not mean, however, that he had powers to give orders to the Minister of Fuel and Power or the Minister of Transport. (176 *H.L. Debates* 523-27)

III

ONE of the commonest charges against the civil service is that it runs the country. A recent minor scandal has revealed how tenuous the control of the Minister can sometimes be. The Crichel Down case, which recently set the British public back on its heels and took the civil service by the ears, gives a slightly sinister point to Sir Ivor Jennings' remark (p. 114) that "the civil service governs; the Ministers control the process of government." For, in this case, the Minister was clearly not controlling the process of government and he had to resign. The civil servants were censured by a court of enquiry, and are undoubtedly rather unpopular in Whitehall just now, but they have not been dismissed. They have been transferred to other jobs. Should civil servants be dismissed? Of course they are for dishonesty

or gross immorality, and they can be (though very rarely are) for inefficiency. In any case, as Mr. Morrison observes, inefficiency is a relative state. Writing before Crichel Down, Morrison thinks that rather more dismissals would be good for the morale of the service, and that problems are not really solved by "well-meant transfers." (p. 326)

Mr. Morrison's views differ somewhat from Jennings' on the question of the relationship of Ministers and civil servants. Morrison says, with truth, that the civil servant prefers a Minister with a mind of his own to a rubber stamp. But perhaps he overstates the part played by the Minister in policy-making. It is not completely true, as Jennings suggests, that "party policy is usually an adaptation of departmental policy" for the reverse is equally true; but certainly civil servants play a greater part than some textbooks suggest. The Minister, as we have already observed, is a busy man. He is a Member of Parliament and a party man as well as an administrator, and it is not often that a man will be equally good at all three. He has to divide his time somehow between Whitehall, Westminster, and his constituency. The latter usually suffers, but he still has to attend party committees and conferences and find time to address public meetings. He has to help to keep his party in power.

There is no doubt that the real task of Ministers becomes more subtle as well as more difficult as government grows in complexity. Everyone would agree that "even the hardest working Minister cannot take a tithe of the decisions which present themselves for decision." The civil servants have to do most of the deciding. The task of a Minister is to see that the civil servants "know his mind" and that his department is so organized that when anything looks like it would become politically important it will be put up to him. Moreover, he must know how to deal with the civil servant who, as has been said, has a difficulty for every solution. Where important issues are involved, he must know how to get his way.

"I recall an experience of requiring a sharp change of policy," says Mr. Morrison (p. 319) "within a week of taking up my first ministerial office, that of Minister of Transport in 1929." This concerned the reorganization and the public control of London's transport system.

For some days he had "keen discussions" with his civil servant advisers, who had worked hard and long on a different policy. Nevertheless, Morrison adhered to his provisional decision, it was upheld by the Cabinet, and "the civil servants with whom I had argued worked very hard in furthering the policy I had decided upon."

The ideal relationship between the Minister and his civil servant advisers should be, and usually is, says Morrison, that of colleagues working together as a team (p. 318), and "the belief among some of the public and even some Members of Parliament that civil servants do not work in harmony with Ministers I have hardly ever found to be justified." (p. 334) He has a high opinion of their energy and resourcefulness, and their incorruptibility. On the first, Sir Ivor Jennings says: "anybody

who consistently follows a line of policy, be it foreign affairs . . . or finance, or social welfare, must frequently be amazed at the fertility of imagination shown by the civil service." (p. 107) Of the second, he says (p. 106): "It says much for Victorian traditions that a service which grew out of patronage should have established and maintained a reputation for honesty as great as that of Her Majesty's judges." The worst that Mr. Morrison can say of them is that sometimes they are not quick enough in accustoming themselves to new ideas. But as Jennings correctly points out "red tape" is a necessary consequence of public control. It is Parliament as much as the civil service that is responsible. Slowness and delay are due less to the personal defects of civil servants than to the very nature of democratic public administration.

Contemporary Topics

Compiled by Public Administration Clearing House

Federal Personnel Legislation

The Civil Service Commission went before the 83d Congress with a comprehensive program for improving federal personnel management. The program was developed on the basis of extensive staff work throughout the commission and discussions of specific proposals with employee organizations and the interested federal agencies. It was reviewed by a special Cabinet subcommittee appointed by President Eisenhower, and at the time it went to Congress he issued a statement expressing his support.

An impressive number of the recommendations included in the administration program were approved by the Congress. Perhaps the most far-reaching measure to be enacted is the group life insurance plan (Pub. Law 598), described in an article in this issue of the *Review*.

Another item of major importance is the modification of the Whitten amendment, which limited the number of permanent employees in the executive branch to the number on the rolls at September 1, 1950. The commission had urged outright repeal of this provision (which went through originally as a rider on an Appropriations Act) because of the administrative complications which it involves. However, the modifications approved will permit the commission to proceed with its new "career conditional" appointment system and to convert to career status many thousands of "indefinite" employees who have been blocked by the provisions of the Whitten amendment.

Other provisions of this general "fringe benefits" act (Pub. Law 763) include a broadening of the incentive awards program; repeal of the 30-day limitation on accumulation of annual leave; provision for several types of "premium" pay for overtime; and an increase in the number of "supergrade" positions from 400 to 550.

A separate act (Pub. Law 767) extends un-

employment compensation to federal employees.

Kestnbaum Commission Staff Changes

G. Lyle Belsley, associate director, Public Administration Clearing House, has been named executive director of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to replace former Congressman Dudley A. White, who resigned as executive director earlier in the year to return to his newspaper publishing business in Ohio. Mr. Belsley has been granted a leave of absence from the clearing house to work with the commission until its final report is forwarded to the President on or before March 1, 1955.

Hugh L. Elsbree, senior specialist in American government and public administration, Library of Congress, has been appointed deputy director of research, to take over part of the duties of George C. S. Benson, president, Claremont Men's College, who will continue as director of research.

Additional Hoover Commission Studies

The Hoover Commission announced the appointment late in August of another major task force to study Overseas Economic Operations. The work of this task force is to include a survey of the Foreign Operations Administration; a check on the Point 4 program to determine whether its activities duplicate similar aid by United Nations agencies; a review of the activities of FOA, the State Department, and the Commerce Department in trade promotion and in the investment of American capital abroad; a study of the economic reporting activities of the State Department which are carried out for other government agencies; and the drafting of recommendations designed to improve the operations, increase the efficiency, and effect economies in the agencies involved.

Chairman of the task force is Henning W. Prentis, Jr., chairman of the board of directors, Armstrong Cork Company, and a former president and lifetime vice president, National Association of Manufacturers. Staff director is Bernard S. Van Rensselaer, a former employee of the Mutual Security Agency, and since March, 1953, a staff member of the Division of Investigations, U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee.

Other studies announced since the Summer, 1954, *Review* (p. 221) include one on special personnel problems in the Department of Defense, to be made by a subcommittee of the task force on Business Organization of the Department of Defense. Thomas R. Reid, director of civil affairs, Ford Motor Company, is chairman of this subcommittee, and John J. Corson, of McKinsey & Company, is vice-chairman. Staff director is Cecil E. Goode, formerly director of Personnel, Federal Civil Defense Administration.

A study of possible duplication of the services of the Military Air Transport Service and commercial air line operations is being made for the transportation subcommittee of the task force on Business Organization of the Department of Defense by Selig Altschul, an independent aviation consultant who has conducted special studies for various congressional committees and for the Department of Commerce. A similar study is being made of the Military Sea Transport Service by Alvin Shapiro, former director of research, American Merchant Marine Institute.

Retirement Policy Report

The five-volume report of the Committee on Retirement Policy for Federal Personnel was completed and released during the summer.

Part I presents the committee's comparative study of the twenty-three federal retirement plans currently in operation and the role of retirement and related benefits in the compensation system.

Parts 2 and 3 include findings and recommendations on the relationships between the old-age and survivors insurance system and the retirement systems for the uniformed service and for the regular civil service.

Part 4 presents an analysis of the current financial status of the several systems and methods of their financing.

Part 5 presents the committee's findings and recommendations on the need for special benefits for special classes of employments, and on the types and amounts of retirement and other related benefits provided to federal personnel. It also completes the committee's findings and recommendations on the relationship between the federal retirement systems and the old-age and survivors insurance system.

Members of the committee, established by Congress in 1952, included the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, director of the Bureau of the Budget, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and H. Eliot Kaplan, who was designated chairman by the President.

The report has been issued as S. Doc. No. 89 and can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Part 1, \$1.50; Part 2, \$0.25; Part 3, \$0.40; Part 4, \$0.25; and Part 5, \$1.00.

Technical Assistance Studies

The technical assistance activities of the United States and related multilateral programs carried on in cooperation with the United Nations and the Organization of American States are a popular subject for study these days. The Hoover Commission has recently appointed a task force in this field (see above); the National Planning Association is engaged in an extensive study of technical assistance programs in Latin America; the Technical Assistance Board of the UN is under mandate of the Economic and Social Council of the UN to "evaluate" the expanded program of technical assistance which is supported by special contributions from the member nations; and two separate studies are being made by committees of the U.S. Senate.

One of the Senate studies is being made by a committee established by S. Res. 214, introduced by Senator Mansfield of Montana. Senator Hickenlooper of Iowa is chairman of this committee which, under the terms of the resolution, includes six members of the Foreign Relations Committee and two other senators not members of the committee and not of the same political party, designated by the president of the Senate. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the resolution (S. Rep. No. 1198, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) notes that

at the time the U.S. program was initiated the committee had recommended that it be limited to a trial period of five years (it is now four years old). The resolution provides that the committee shall make its report by January 31, 1955.

The second study is being made by the Senate Appropriations Committee and is an outgrowth, in part, of dissatisfaction in the committee with the practice followed by the U.S. delegation to the UN of pledging the U.S. contribution for the expanded technical assistance program for six months in advance of authorization by Congress—a practice which arises out of the fact that the UN operates on a calendar year budget whereas the U.S. operates on a fiscal year budget. The report of the committee (S. Rep. No. 2268, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) states that the current appropriation is made

. . . with the understanding that no further pledge shall be made to the United Nations for the expanded technical assistance program by any representative of the United States Government without prior authorization by the Congress of the United States [and] with the further understanding that a study will be instituted by the Senate Committee on Appropriations [which] will explore all reasonable alternatives to the present system of handling United States participation in the multilateral technical assistance program, including particularly that of making direct appropriations to the international organizations which do the technical assistance work, rather than in the form of a blank check to a central fund which is under the control of the United Nations, including nations controlled or dominated by the U.S.S.R.

Sixth American Assembly

The federal government service was the subject discussed by a broadly representative group of American leaders from the fields of business, labor, agriculture, the professions, and government at the Sixth American Assembly, held at Arden House on the Harriman Campus of Columbia University, October 7-10. Principal findings of the Assembly, printed in full in *The New York Times*, October 11, relate to building greater prestige for the federal service, fixing responsibility for personnel management, developing better recruitment and training programs, administering loyalty and security programs that will safeguard the country and the individual rights of the public

servant, and building pride and unity throughout the federal service.

In preparation for the Assembly, a research staff, headed by Wallace S. Sayre of Columbia University, gathered pertinent facts, figures, and opinions in a series of reports which were published in a workbook which served as the basis of discussions. The workbook, titled *The Federal Government Service: Its Character, Prestige, and Problems* (179 pp.), included the following reports: Herbert Kaufman, "The Growth of the Federal Personnel System"; Herman M. Somers, "The President, the Congress, and the Federal Government Service"; Harvey C. Mansfield, "Political Parties, Patronage, and the Federal Government Service"; Frederick and Edith Mosher, "Distinguishing Marks of the Federal Government Service"; and Everett Reimer, "Modern Personnel Management and the Federal Government Service."

The workbook will be followed by a final edition that will contain the research papers and a definitive account of the discussions at Arden House, the views expressed by the participants, and the positions taken by them. Copies of the workbook and the final edition are available on individual request without charge. Address requests and inquiries to: Edwin T. Gibson, Executive Director, The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business Building, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.

Patronage and the Civil Service

A number of newspaper stories and public statements during the summer and early autumn reflected the growing concern of supporters of the career civil service over activities which appeared to expose the merit system to partisan political influence.

Most outspoken were the writers of the federal employee columns which the Washington papers carry as a regular feature: Jerry Klutzz, "The Federal Diary," in *The Washington Post*; John Cramer, "9:00 to 4:30," in *The Daily News*; and Joe Young, "Federal Spotlight," in *The Washington Star*. In his column for July 19, Klutzz cited as "a notable example" the Foreign Operations Administration, "where even stenographers and clerks have been required to produce the 'proper political clearance' and no appointment or promotion

can be finally approved . . . unless it has the approval of the lady there who is Stassen's liaison with the Administration's political arm." The same column stated: "In recent weeks agency heads have received 'Confidential: not for publication' letters on White House stationery" directing them to clear with the Republican National Committee all positions in Grade 14 (\$9,600 starting salary) and above "whether they are in or out of the Civil Service System."

On August 3 Kluttz reported that a second order had been issued, modifying the first, advising agency heads that the original directive was not meant to apply to jobs under the civil service system or to the promotions of career employees.

About the same time, letters went to all U.S. department and major agency heads from the National Civil Service League which said in part: "We believe that requiring partisan political clearance before promoting civil service employees is such an impediment to a good civil service that we are under a duty to oppose it as an abuse of a public trust."

In a speech before a group of field officials and personnel officers at Syracuse, New York, August 26, Philip Young, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, took special note of the "allegations of politics." In addition to calling their attention to the fact that any form of political clearance for civil service jobs is prohibited by the Civil Service Act and the civil service rules, he quoted from a letter he had received from President Eisenhower which reaffirmed his full support of the commission and emphasized the importance of "the protection of the career civil service against any encroachment of politics—personal or party."

There has also been distributed to the heads of the departments and agencies a *Guide for Personnel Actions* which specifically forbids the requirement of political clearance for civil service positions.

Any action on the part of any person which is contrary to this policy is a potential embarrassment to the President and opens him personally to the criticism that he is playing politics with the civil service. Therefore, it is imperative that all possible steps be taken to see to it that all persons dealing with personnel matters in your organization are fully informed concerning the civil service laws, rules and regulations.

Internal Revenue Service Training

A training center to provide special advanced study for agents of the Internal Revenue Service has been established in the School of Business at the University of Michigan under a government contract made possible by recent congressional action authorizing the expenditure of not more than \$400,000 for this purpose during the 1955 fiscal year.

The program will cover one full semester with approximately 100 students enrolled for each session. Agents chosen to take the course will be selected from nominations made by the nine regional commissioners of IRS. Generally, employees will be selected for training from the ranks of internal revenue agents in grades GS-7 and GS-9 who have satisfactorily completed at least one year of service. Employees taking the course who do not remain with the service for a minimum of three years following completion of the training will be required to repay part of their training costs.

Instruction, which will be largely at the graduate school level, will include technical tax and finance subjects as well as courses on the policies, practices, and problems of business management. The program will be conducted mainly by the regular university faculty, with the Revenue Service supplying specialists not otherwise available.

The University of Michigan was selected from more than twenty universities submitting bids for operating the training center. A special ten-man advisory committee assisted Commissioner T. Coleman Andrews in his selection.

Public Employees and Political Action

Limitations on political activity by public service employees were highlighted by President Eisenhower's veto at the end of the last session of Congress of the D. C. presidential primary bill. The President expressed approval of the general purpose of the bill which would have established machinery in the voteless District of Columbia to enable residents to vote for delegates to the national party conventions and for national committee members, but vetoed it because he believed some of its provisions violated the Hatch Act. This act, passed in 1939, regulates the political activities of federal employees in the civil service. An amendment, passed in 1940, extends its appli-

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cation to state and local government employees whose salaries are paid in whole or in part from federal funds.

The employees of many state and local governments are under similar restraints. A recent publication, *Regulating Political Activities of Public Employees*, by Richard Christopherson, provides an analytical summary of the practices of 88 cities and 14 states in regulating political activities of their employees. The study concludes that the two fundamental problems are how much to regulate and how to enforce the regulations. Complexity of the problem has resulted in emphasis on the concrete elements of political activity. It is necessary to differentiate between partisan and non-partisan activities, between what the employee does on his own and on the public's time, and between standards covering candidacies and those covering issues. The report may be purchased from the Civil Service Assembly, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois. Personnel Report No. 543, 13 pp. \$2.00.

Retirement Benefits for State and Local Employees

State and local employees may now obtain coverage under the federal old-age and survivors insurance system even if they are already under a retirement system.

Coverage of state and local employees had been limited to those not covered by another system. Amendments to the Social Security Act enacted by the last Congress make it possible for public agencies desiring to coordinate their retirement systems with federal social security to do so through state-federal agreements, subject to approval by the state legislature, the local legislative body if the retirement plan was originally established by local ordinance, and a majority vote of the members covered by the local plan.

The amendments became effective September 1, 1954, but enabling legislation will be required in most states to implement the new law.

State Budgets and Federal Aid

The 1953 session of the Montana Legislative Assembly amended its budget law to require that state agency requests for federal aid funds should be submitted through the state controller for approval by the assembly (or by the

Governor when the assembly is not in session) before submission to the appropriate federal agency.

Similar legislation adopted earlier by Wisconsin provides that the Governor, on behalf of the state, shall accept any federal funds made available to the state and that he may, in exercising this authority, "stipulate as a condition of the acceptance . . . such conditions as in his discretion may be necessary to safeguard the interests of the state of Wisconsin."

Provisions of this kind in state budget laws highlight one of the important problems in the area of intergovernmental relations being considered by the Kestnbaum Commission. A study made by the Council of State Governments in 1949 found "rather general agreement that federal grants-in-aid should be reflected in state budgets as revenues and that fiscal control over the expenditure of such moneys should be the same as over state funds," though opinions vary as to the best way to accomplish this control. A model state law on this subject, proposed by the council in 1951, has been adopted in part in Florida and in Connecticut.

University Research on City Purchasing

The Institute of Industrial Research, University of Louisville, is helping the city of Louisville set standards for the things it buys. Members of the institute's staff are cooperating with city officials in reviewing Louisville's specifications for paints, gasoline, fuel oil, lubricants, and tires and recommending changes they think are necessary. Once the purchases are made, the institute tests the items to make sure that required standards are met. Under the terms of the arrangement, the institute charges the city only the extra costs of its research.

Performance Budgeting for Cities

Two pamphlets recently published by the Municipal Finance Officers Association offer the lessons of experience for the guidance of cities contemplating adoption of the performance-type budget.

An Administrative Case Study of Performance Budgeting in the City of Los Angeles, California, by George A. Terhune, "records all steps taken during the preliminary plan-

ning, budget preparation, and budget adoption phases of the 1952-53 budget, the first budget of the city of Los Angeles to be prepared on a performance budget basis [and] includes a detailed explanation of the performance budget reporting procedure which was installed after the 1952-53 budget was adopted.

Performance Budgeting and Unit Cost Accounting for Governmental Units consists of three papers: Frank A. Lowe, "How to Initiate a Performance Budget Program"; Orin K. Cope, "Operation Analysis—The Basis for Performance Budgeting"; and Joseph M. Cunningham, "Accounting and the Performance Budget."

These pamphlets may be purchased from MFOA, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, for \$1.25 and \$1.00 respectively.

Municipal League Fellowship

The National Municipal League has established a \$1,500 fellowship, open to state and local government employees, for attendance at the Advanced Management Program of the Graduate School of Business Administration, at Harvard University. This is a 19-week program in which 150 top executives from business, leading administrators from the federal government, and senior officers of the armed forces participate.

Winner of the fellowship this year is Russell J. Cooney, city manager, Merced, California. His participation in the program will mark the first time since its inauguration after World War II that a state or municipal government official has been enrolled.

Minnesota Certificate Program

The University of Minnesota, through its General Extension Division, is offering a program of study leading to a Certificate in Public Administration. The program is intended primarily for federal, state, and local government employees in the Twin Cities area. Its purposes are (1) to provide an understanding of the fundamentals of public administration and an opportunity to study in detail some of the problems and techniques of administration, (2) to enable each student to carry out an individual program of study designed to fit his needs, and (3) to supplement the in-service

training programs of government agencies.

The certificate program requires 45 credit hours distributed among core, elective, and subject matter fields. The core requirement includes 15 credit hours of survey courses in American government, introduction to public administration, public personnel administration, and public financial administration. The list of elective courses from which candidates for the certificate must choose at least five (15 credit hours) includes municipal law and administration, employee training techniques, problems in public administration, administrative analysis, administrative communication, problems in tax administration, city and county planning, business and government, administrative regulation, public relations, governmental accounting, and statistics. The remaining 15 credit hours must be in a subject matter field such as political science, psychology, accounting, or industrial relations.

The courses which are included in the certificate program are taught in the evening, though equivalent courses offered elsewhere in the university or by correspondence may also be applied toward the certificate.

Inter-University Case Program

Edwin A. Bock, of the staff of the New York office, Public Administration Clearing House, has been appointed staff director of the Inter-University Case Program to succeed Paul N. Ylvisaker who resigned to accept a position as administrative assistant to Mayor Joseph S. Clark, Jr., of Philadelphia.

The ICP office has been moved from Swarthmore College to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Building, 45 East 65th Street, New York, which also houses the New York office of PACH. Mr. Bock will continue his association with PACH-NY on a part-time basis.

ICP pamphlets will continue to be printed and distributed by the University of Alabama Press, Drawer 2877, University, Alabama. Queries on subscriptions, publication plans, privileges of membership, and the like should be addressed to the New York headquarters.

IIAS Round Table

A Round Table of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences at The Hague July 23-28, 1954, brought together over

90 participants from 39 countries and 8 international bodies.

The Council of Administration, composed of delegates of member-states and national sections, under the chairmanship of M. René Cassin of France, authorized the creation of sections of international civil servants stationed in the same area. Plans are under way for the organization of sections in New York, Paris, and Geneva.

The Council of Administration also adopted a new schedule of dues based upon the United Nations scale of contributions. This should greatly facilitate the admission of less developed countries with large populations, such as India, to membership in IAS.

In addition to the business meetings, small groups held discussions of two principal subjects: public economic enterprise and in-service training.

Participants from the United States included Charles Aikin, University of California; Charles S. Ascher, Public Administration Clearing House; Lynton K. Caldwell, UN Institute of Public Administration, Ankara, Turkey; Albert Gorrive, Brooklyn College; William Ronan, New York University; MacDonald Salter, Foreign Operations Administration; and Donald C. Stone, Springfield College.

The Round Table for 1955 will be a residential week at one of the Oxford colleges during the first half of July, for which the Royal Institute of Public Administration will be host.

IULA Congress

The XIIth Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities will be held in Rome, Italy, September 26-October 1, 1955, at the invitation of Mayor Beccherini of Rome. Other postwar congresses of IULA—at Brighton in 1951 and Vienna in 1953—have attracted some hundreds of municipal officials from more than 30 countries of North America, Europe, and Asia, including delegations of mayors and other officials from the U.S.

The main subject for discussion at the coming congress is "Local Government Finance—Its Importance for Local Autonomy." Mr. Carl H. Chatters, former director of the American Municipal Association and the Municipal Fi-

nance Officers Association, is preparing the report for the U.S. This report will be synthesized with reports from fifteen to twenty other national leagues of municipalities, and a general report will be printed in advance of the congress in three languages, to allow the full time for discussion by participants.

Another topic will be "Cultural Activities of Local Authorities," for which Mr. Orin Nolting, assistant director, International City Managers' Association, is preparing the U.S. report. IULA is collaborating with UNESCO on this theme and the two organizations will hold a special working party on municipal activities for adult education at the time of the congress.

The congress will be preceded, on September 25, by a "European Day," at which Henri Brugmans, rector of the College of Europe, and others will discuss the importance of strengthened local government for European integration.

Further information about IULA and the congress can be obtained from Herbert Emmerich, chairman, American Committee for International Municipal Cooperation, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.

Arab Public Administration Conference

A three-day Public Administration Conference, believed to be the first of its kind in the Arab world, was held in Beirut under the auspices of the American University of Beirut at the end of July. The sessions were attended by 80 persons from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Syria. The participants included many of the leading Arab professors and practitioners of public administration.

The conference was the culmination of the university's first In-Service Training Seminar in Public Administration, which had started at the beginning of July and was attended by 30 career government officials from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

Most of the work of the conference was done in panel discussions. Members of the conference read prepared addresses, which were followed by a general discussion open to the public. Rapporteurs are preparing résumés of the proceedings of the panels which will be available for distribution shortly.

At the close of the conference the participants from each country selected one person to represent them on a permanent committee that will work out a plan for holding future conferences in other Arab capitals.

Statistical Training Center, University of the Philippines

The first training session of the Statistical Center, located in the Institute of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines, began on June 24 with 35 students. The center was established by the Philippine government with the assistance of the UN. The government is providing the director, lecturers, premises, and other facilities. The UN Technical Assistance Administration is contributing some equipment and documentation as well as two experts to assist in the direction, instruction, research, and advisory activities of the center. The center will provide, in co-operation with government agencies, both in-service training and graduate instruction leading to the degree of M.A. in Statistics.

Africanization of the Gold Coast Public Service

The development of the Gold Coast's policy on Africanization of the Public Service, the means by which it has been implemented, and the extent to which progress has been made are reviewed in a *Statement on the Programme of the Africanization of the Public Service*, published this year by the Gold Coast government (Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1954, Accra, Gold Coast, 76 pp., \$0.66).

The number of Africans holding senior posts in the civil service has risen from 10 per cent in 1949 to 36 per cent. Since 1952, 5 Africans have been appointed to top-level positions, and at least 45 Africans now hold influential posts in their departments or ministries. In addition to these senior posts, there are over 20,000 other African members of the civil service.

The first Africanization scheme, attempted from 1926 to 1946, failed primarily because no specific provision was made for training Africans. The new policy adopted after the World War II recognized that training is the key to building an effective indigenous civil service.

A Scholarships Selection Board was set up in 1945 to centralize the government's training

program. Since then nearly 1,000 scholarships have been awarded for higher education and practical or technical training. In 1953 a policy was adopted which places responsibility on departments to finance scholarships relating to their work.

A program for recruitment and training has been established in the Chief Secretary's Office, under the direction of A. L. Adu, a former UN fellow in Puerto Rico. Under this program a Civil Service Training Center has been opened to supplement the facilities of higher and technical educational institutions in the Gold Coast and the accelerated scholarship program for foreign study. A biennial journal, the *Gold Coast Public Servant*, has been launched, containing news of training programs, and articles about administrative problems and the process of Africanization.

The Gold Coast now advertises all civil service vacancies except those filled by internal promotion and those for which it is known that local personnel are not available. A register of all Gold Coast students studying at home or overseas is maintained. Pamphlets are being prepared to explain to secondary schools and the general public the careers open to candidates, the qualifications required, and the scholarship schemes in operation. To give candidates for the civil service information about staff arrangements, each department has been asked to prepare a scheme of service, outlining its staffing and promotion policy and describing further training facilities available in the department.

Teheran Institute of Administrative Affairs

The University of Teheran is establishing a Technical Institute of Administrative Affairs to expand and improve its pre- and post-entry public administration training and to sponsor research and consulting activities. The University of Southern California, under an FOA contract, will assist in its development. The plans for the contract were made by university officials in cooperation with Dean Henry Reinig, Jr., and Professor Harry A. Marlow of the University of Southern California, who spent several weeks in Iran in the spring of 1954. Several University of Southern California professors will go to Teheran to work with officials

of the University of Teheran and a number of Iranian professors will come to the U.S. to broaden this experience in public administration. Mr. Marlow is already in Iran.

Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East

The Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East in Ankara completed its first academic year in June. It had a registration of 160 students in the first semester and 176 in the second. All the enrollees were active administrators—"middle managers" nominated by their employers. The institute has now established two programs, one leading to a certificate, the other to a two-year diploma course.

The institute has produced several research studies of general interest, has translated considerable material for teaching purposes, and plans to extend its activities in in-service training.

The third team of faculty to be provided by the UN began teaching in October. Lynton K. Caldwell, of Syracuse University, is serving as co-director of the institute. Robert V. Presthus, of Michigan State College, is a member of the staff.

New Public Administration Journal

A new journal, *L'Organizzazione Tecnica Della Pubblica Amministrazione*, has been launched by the Office of Administrative Reform in Italy. The office, which has been directed since its inception in 1951 by Giuseppe Cataldi, professor of administrative law, has conducted intensive studies of the bureaucracy and has made many recommendations for improvement. During the summer of 1954, in cooperation with FOA, it conducted a six-week in-service training program for administrative personnel on the principles and practices of organization and methods work, and plans are being made for similar training sessions to be held in the future.

The first issue of the journal, January-March, 1954, reviews the progress in administrative reform which has been made since 1950 and explores continuing practical problems. It also invites and encourages cooperation and an exchange of ideas between public administration and private enterprise.

Fourth International Congress of Comparative Law

The Fourth International Congress of Comparative Law, sponsored by the Academy of Comparative Law and held at the Faculty of Law in Paris, August 1-7, 1954, brought together about 250 lawyers and professors. The section on public law included discussions of legal control of public industrial services; the law of the public service; and the organization and management of public corporations.

This section attracted the largest participation of any of the many sections, including men from Greece, Japan, Iraq, Israel, and Egypt. Political scientists from the U.S. included Karl Loewenstein, Amherst College; Charles Aikin, University of California; and Charles S. Ascher, Public Administration Clearing House. John N. Hazard, Columbia University, was secretary of the U.S. delegation. Roscoe Pound is president of the academy.

ECLA Training Program

A new training program, organized by the Economic Commission for Latin America in collaboration with the UN Technical Assistance Administration, brings a selected group of Latin American economists to ECLA headquarters in Santiago each year for a nine-month course in economic development. The 1954 program, April-December, began with a study of basic statistical tools. The course also includes training in the techniques of programming economic development and the evaluation of projects. The last part of the course is devoted to the administrative and executive aspects of programming. The experience of development corporations and similar bodies in Latin America is considered and visits are made to the principal industrial centers of Chile.

The training program is held in the ECLA secretariat building, thereby giving the fellows an opportunity to study and work with the economists of ECLA. This year there are two fellows from Chile and one each from Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In addition there are two economists from the Middle East, one from Egypt, and one from Iran.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Fourth edition will be ready in the fall.

by Leonard D. White, Professor of Public Administration, Harvard University

This book describes, analyzes and evaluates the institutions of American government from the point of view of public administration. Rather than dealing with municipal, state or federal practice, it presents a process common to all levels of government. The major areas covered are: organization, personnel and control.

The new fourth edition has been brought up to date and illuminated by references to historical foundations, making this one of the author's thirty years of experience in the field. There are new chapters on post-World War II trends in the relations of management and labor; an entirely new chapter on headquarters-field relations; the Hoover Commission and up-to-date material on reorganization of other departments.

Other books by Leonard D. White

THE FEDERALISTS A Study in Administrative History, 1789-1829

This is the concluding volume of Professor White's monumental study of the first forty years of American government. As in the earlier volumes, *The Federalists* and *The Jeffersonians*, the author uses his unique perspective and human understanding to make "the dead come alive" in their conflicts with the powers, functions and duties of the executive and legislative branches during years of turbulent history.

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